Selection Pressure in Strategic Environments

战略环境中的选择压力

• 批准号: 2214979
• 负责人: John Duffy
• 金额: $ 32.76万
• 依托单位: University of California-Irvine
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-07-01 至 2024-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2214979&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Selection; Pressure; Strategic; Environments

Competition for scarce resources in the face of birth and death (the struggle for survival) has shaped social and economic interaction since the very beginnings of mankind. This research is the first to induce selection pressure in controlled strategic decision-making experiments using performance-based replacement of participants over time. The studies advance unique insights into how real-life human decision makers manage short- versus long-term strategic tradeoffs in the face of evolutionary competition. The effect of selection pressure on strategic decision-making is assessed by comparing two treatment conditions. In the selection pressure condition participants' survival (and payoffs) depend on their performance relative to that of other participants. Performance is evaluated every few periods and participants earning low payoffs relative to their peers are more likely to be replaced by new, inexperienced performers. In the control, no pressure condition, participants are selected for removal with the same frequency as under the selection pressure situation, but removal is random rather than based on relative performance. This experimental design enables the causal identification of the effects of selection pressure on behavior.Strategic decision-making is considered in three well-known economic applications, each with and without selection pressure. The first application is to repeated Tullock-type rent seeking contests. The experiment uses selection pressure to empirically separate evolutionary adaptive and maladaptive psychological mechanisms that have been proposed to explain the intensely competitive behavior of contestants in previous contest experiments that lacked selection pressure. The second application concerns evolving norms and social change. Selection pressure in repeated coordination games is used to study how short-term risks and long-term gains lead to path-dependencies in experimental equilibrium selection. The final application is to bargaining. In repeated Nash Demand games, the study addresses whether selection pressure helps increase the efficiency of bargaining conventions relative to results from previous experiments without selection pressure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

自从人类开始以来，面对出生和死亡（生存的斗争）争取稀缺资源的竞争已经塑造了社会和经济的互动。这项研究是第一个使用基于绩效的参与者随着时间的推移替换绩效的替代者，在受控战略决策实验中诱导选择压力。研究提出了对现实生活中的人类决策者如何在进化竞争中如何管理短期战略权衡的独特见解。通过比较两种治疗条件来评估选择压力对战略决策制定的影响。在选择压力条件下，参与者的生存（和回报）取决于他们相对于其他参与者的表现。每隔几个时期就会评估绩效，相对于同龄人的参与者更有可能被新的，没有经验的表演者所取代。在控制中，没有压力条件，选择参与者以与选择压力情况相同的频率去除，但是去除是随机的，而不是基于相对性能。这种实验设计使选择压力对行为的影响进行因果鉴定。在三种众所周知的经济应用中考虑了战略决策，每种都有和没有选择压力。第一个申请是重复塔洛克型租金竞赛。该实验使用选择压力将已提出的凭经验分开的进化自适应和适应性心理机制分开，以解释参赛者在没有选择压力的先前竞赛实验中的强烈竞争行为。 第二个应用程序涉及不断发展的规范和社会变革。 重复协调游戏中的选择压力用于研究短期风险和长期收益如何导致实验平衡选择中的路径依赖性。最终申请是谈判。在反复的NASH需求游戏中，该研究解决了选择压力是否有助于提高谈判惯例的效率相对于先前没有选择压力的实验的结果。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并且认为值得通过基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响来通过评估来获得支持。