Doctoral Dissertation Research In Economics: Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting: An Experimental Study

经济学博士论文研究：强制投票与自愿投票：一项实验研究

• 批准号: 1123914
• 负责人: John Duffy
• 金额: $ 1.13万
• 依托单位: University of Pittsburgh
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-08-15 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1123914&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Compulsory

This award funds a doctoral dissertation that will use laboratory experiments to study the consequences of compulsory voting mechanisms on voting behavior. Voting may be voluntary or compulsory. For instance, voting may be compulsory (no abstention) or voluntary (abstention allowed) in small committees or in jury deliberations. In U.S. federal district courts, juror abstention from voting on a verdict in a criminal matter is not allowed while juror abstention is allowed in certain U.S. state courts; for example in civil cases where unanimity is not required. There are also differences in voting rules for larger-scale, national elections. Argentina, Australia and Belgium are among several nations where voting (more accurately, showing up to vote) in national elections is compelled by law. The coPI plans a laboratory experiment to study the consequences of compulsory or voluntary voting mechanisms on voting behavior using the set-up of the Condorcet jury model. In that setting, individual voters all share a common interest, for instance, to acquit the innocent or to convict the guilty, but prior to any voting, each individual receives noisy private information regarding the true binary state of nature, e.g., whether the accused is innocent or guilty. The jury's (electorate's) choice is determined by majority rule. He studies two different voting mechanisms: (1) compulsory voting, where all voters are required to vote, and (2) voluntary voting, where each voter may first independently choose whether to abstain or to vote. In the latter case, we also consider whether voting is costly or not. Game theory predicts that under either voting mechanism rational (i.e. strategic) voters will employ mixed strategies in equilibrium (under certain conditions). In the mixed strategy equilibrium of the compulsory voting mechanism, rational voters should sometimes vote strategically, i.e., against their private signal regarding the true state of nature, and otherwise vote sincerely, i.e., in accordance with their private signal. Such behavior can be rationalized by the recognition that other voters may have different signals and in small groups, there is some chance that an individual voter?s choice is pivotal to the outcome; these pivotality concerns can outweigh the value of the private signal, creating incentives to vote strategically. By contrast, in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the voluntary voting mechanism, rational voters resolve pivotality issues by playing a mixed strategy not with respect to the sincerity of their vote but with respect to their decision to vote or to abstain from voting; under the voluntary mechanism, all those who choose to vote are predicted to vote sincerely, according to their private signal. Voter participation rates under the voluntary mechanism are all endogenously determined. Participation decisions are further affected if there are costs to voting.The laboratory study funded by this award investigates all of these behavioral predictions. The study uses a 2x2 design where the treatment variables are whether 1) voting is compulsory or voluntary and 2) (in the voluntary treatment) whether voting is costly or not. Experimental methods are well-suited to testing these theoretical predictions as the laboratory environment enables precise control over the voting mechanisms, the states of nature, private signals, group sizes and voting costs; environmental features that are difficult (if not impossible) to control in the field. The experimental findings from this first-ever study comparing compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms will yield us a better understanding of voting behavior under these two mechanisms and may also provide some rationale as to why both mechanisms are used.

该奖项资助一篇博士论文，该论文将利用实验室实验来研究强制投票机制对投票行为的影响。 投票可以是自愿的，也可以是强制的。例如，在小型委员会或陪审团审议中，投票可能是强制性的（不允许弃权）或自愿的（允许弃权）。在美国联邦地区法院，陪审员不允许对刑事案件的判决进行弃权投票，而美国某些州法院则允许陪审员弃权；例如，在不需要一致同意的民事案件中。更大规模的全国选举的投票规则也存在差异。阿根廷、澳大利亚和比利时等国家法律强制要求在全国选举中投票（更准确地说，是到场投票）。 coPI 计划进行一项实验室实验，利用孔多塞陪审团模型的设置来研究强制或自愿投票机制对投票行为的影响。在这种情况下，个体选民都有共同的利益，例如，无罪释放或定罪有罪，但在任何投票之前，每个人都会收到关于真正的二元自然状态的嘈杂的私人信息，例如，被告是无辜还是有罪。陪审团（选民）的选择由多数规则决定。他研究了两种不同的投票机制：（1）强制投票，所有选民都必须投票；（2）自愿投票，每个选民可以首先独立选择弃权或投票。 在后一种情况下，我们还考虑投票是否有成本。 博弈论预测，在任一投票机制下，理性（即战略）选民将在均衡中（在某些条件下）采用混合策略。在强制投票机制的混合策略均衡中，理性选民有时应该进行策略性投票，即反对他们关于真实自然状态的私人信号，而在其他情况下则应真诚地投票，即按照他们的私人信号进行投票。这种行为可以通过认识到其他选民可能有不同的信号而合理化，并且在小群体中，个别选民的选择有可能对结果至关重要；这些关键性问题可能超过私人信号的价值，从而激励人们进行战略性投票。相比之下，在自愿投票机制的混合策略均衡中，理性选民通过采取混合策略来解决关键性问题，这种混合策略不是针对投票的诚意，而是针对投票或弃权的决定；在自愿机制下，所有选择投票的人都将根据他们的私人信号真诚地投票。自愿机制下的选民参与率都是内生决定的。如果投票有成本，参与决策会进一步受到影响。该奖项资助的实验室研究调查了所有这些行为预测。该研究采用 2x2 设计，其中处理变量为 1) 投票是强制的还是自愿的，以及 2)（在自愿处理中）投票是否昂贵。 实验方法非常适合测试这些理论预测，因为实验室环境可以精确控制投票机制、自然状态、私人信号、群体规模和投票成本；在现场很难（如果不是不可能）控制的环境特征。 这项首次比较强制投票机制和自愿投票机制的研究的实验结果将使我们更好地理解这两种机制下的投票行为，并可能为为什么使用这两种机制提供一些理由。