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Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Enabling Programmable In-Network Security for an Attack-Resilient Smart Grid

Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Enabling Programmable In-Network Security for an Attack-Resilient Smart Grid
协作研究:SaTC:核心:小型:为抵御攻击的智能电网实现可编程网内安全
批准号:
2247722
负责人:
Hui Lin
金额:
$28.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2023
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2023-06-01 至 2026-05-31

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中文摘要
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英文摘要
Modern energy systems are increasingly adopting Internet technology to boost efficiency, which opens new security frontiers. On the one hand, the underlying network infrastructure used by existing power grids significantly limits the performance of current security measures. On the other hand, Internet companies are undergoing a foundational change in their network infrastructure, mainly driven by deploying advanced programmable network architectures. This project aims to create and quantify programmable in-network security measures for an attack-resilient power grid. Achieving this objective involves integrating the advancement of data-plane programmability into energy system cyber infrastructure, and based on this, further exploring numerous applications across attack detection, mitigation, and prevention to secure today’s energy systems. The outcomes of the project will have significant impacts on industrial practice through the suitable adoption of the proposed programmable cyber-infrastructure to realize a defense-in-depth approach for future energy systems. The work will also train students and workforce with cutting-edge and cross-disciplinary knowledge in power systems, networking, and cyber-security. The project aims to build the next-generation programmable cyber-infrastructure for energy system protection with three research thrusts: (i) an in-network cyber-attack detection system with high-speed and customizable packet inspection; (ii) a self-healing system that automatically restores network connectivity and recovers corrupted measurements by considering characteristics from both communication networks and physical devices; and (iii) an in-network traffic scheduler that disrupts attack reconnaissance while maintaining quality-of-service requirements. The impact of the proposed research will lay a scientific foundation for system design through the development of models, algorithms, and tools that incorporate both cyber and physical system properties.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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CAREER: PARP: Mislead Physical-Disruption Attacks by Preemptive Anti-Reconnaissance for Power Grids Cyber-Physical Infrastructures
  • 批准号:
    2144513
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $50.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 负责人:
    Hui Lin
  • 依托单位:
CRII: SaTC: Preempting Physical Damage from Control-Related Attacks on Smart Grids' Cyber-Physical Infrastructure
  • 批准号:
    2041643
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $14.87万
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
    Hui Lin
  • 依托单位:
CRII: SaTC: Preempting Physical Damage from Control-Related Attacks on Smart Grids' Cyber-Physical Infrastructure
国内基金
海外基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
  • 批准号:
    24ZR1403900
  • 项目类别:
    省市级项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    SATOSHI NAWATA
  • 依托单位:
Cell Research
Cell Research
Cell Research (细胞研究)