权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

The personal(ized) vote and parliamentary representation

个人投票和议会代表权

基本信息

批准号：
263496525
负责人：
Thomas Däubler, Ph.D.
金额：
--
依托单位：
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2013-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/263496525?language=en
关键词：
personal ized vote parliamentary representation

项目摘要

Electoral systems define how voters choose among political parties and candidates, and as a consequence also affect how re-election-seeking representatives will behave in office. The design of electoral systems therefore shapes the extent to which representation is based on persons on the one hand and on parties on the other. Existing work on the consequences of electoral systems for personal representation has provided important insights, but suffers from both theoretical and methodological weaknesses. With regard to theory, it is usually assumed that re-election-seeking is the only motivation of representatives to appeal on personal grounds. Most studies consider only a single personal vote-seeking activity and also fail to explicitly address the implications of personal representation for party-based representation. In terms of methodology, cross-national studies struggle with separating effects of electoral system type from those of other country-level variables. The proposed project will address the theoretical shortcomings by distinguishing two underlying motivations of representatives, looking at several types of representation efforts and treating personal and party focus as two separate, but interrelated dimensions of representation. The empirical analysis will exploit intra-country variation in direct measures of electoral incentives, by considering two countries that recently "personalized" specific rules of their flexible list electoral systems. The aims of the project are to understand how two motivations - pursuing re-election as such and fostering personal reputation through electoral performance more widely - shape incentives to focus on personal constituents on the one hand and on candidate selectors within the party on the other. The project will examine how these general (and unobservable) incentives are translated into specific and observable choices of parliamentary actions. In order to realize these goals, the project will develop formal principal-agent models that allow to derive predictions for the number and type of activities chosen, the topics covered, and the policy positions taken. The predictions will be assessed with data from the Czech Republic and Sweden. These countries use flexible list electoral systems, under which the relative value of list rank and personal votes depends on specific electoral rules and the extent to which voters make use of the optional vote for candidates. Reforms of those rules, in interaction with voters' inclination to use the candidate vote option, create variation in electoral incentives within a country. This variation can effectively be used to study how "personalization" incentives affect what representatives do and to whom they respond. While giving voters more say in deciding which specific candidates will obtain seats is desirable as such, it is important to examine the wider consequences of such institutional designs.

选举制度决定了选民如何在政党和候选人中进行选择，因此也影响了寻求连任的代表在任职期间的行为。因此，选举制度的设计决定了代表在多大程度上一方面以个人为基础，另一方面以政党为基础。关于选举制度对个人代表的影响的现有工作提供了重要的见解，但在理论和方法上都存在缺陷。在理论上，通常认为寻求连任是代表以个人理由上诉的唯一动机。大多数研究只考虑了单一的个人寻求选票活动，也没有明确地讨论个人代表对基于政党的代表的影响。就方法而言，跨国研究努力将选举制度类型的影响与其他国家一级变量的影响区分开来。拟议的项目将通过区分代表的两个基本动机，考察几种类型的代表努力，并将个人和政党的重点视为代表的两个独立但相互关联的层面，来解决理论上的缺陷。经验分析将通过考虑最近将其灵活名单选举制度的具体规则“个人化”的两个国家，利用国家内部对选举激励措施的直接衡量的差异。该项目的目的是了解两种动机--寻求连任和通过更广泛的选举表现培养个人声誉--如何形成一方面关注个人选民，另一方面关注党内候选人选择者的动机。该项目将研究如何将这些一般性(和不可观察到的)激励转化为具体和可观察到的议会行动选择。为了实现这些目标，该项目将开发正式的委托-代理模型，以便对所选活动的数量和类型、所涵盖的主题和所采取的政策立场作出预测。这些预测将用捷克共和国和瑞典的数据进行评估。这些国家使用灵活的名单选举制度，在这种制度下，名单排名和个人选票的相对价值取决于具体的选举规则以及选民对候选人的可选投票的利用程度。这些规则的改革，与选民使用候选人投票选项的倾向相互作用，在一个国家内创造了不同的选举激励措施。这种差异可以有效地用来研究“个性化”激励如何影响代表做什么以及他们对谁做出回应。虽然在决定哪些特定候选人将获得席位方面给予选民更多发言权是可取的，但重要的是审查这种制度设计的更广泛后果。