What's the use of emotions in classical pragmatism? A critical analysis of 'experience' and 'action' in the works of John Dewey and Charles S. Peirce (with an eye to clarifying normative aspects of human-animal relationships)

众所周知，古典哲学实用主义声称能够将哲学探究集中在所谓的真实的问题上，并通过这样做在最广泛的意义上改善人类经验。这一奋进的成功依赖于它对思想和行动如何内在联系的概念。此外，古典实用主义也以某种非正统的方法来区分理论哲学和实践哲学而闻名，例如倡导（臭名昭著的）实践至上。与此同时，对于不同的实用主义作品是否存在统一性，人们几乎没有达成共识。特别是在实践哲学中，实用主义的含义确实是一个悬而未决的问题;人与动物关系所产生的问题就是一个很好的例子。因此，由于主流学术动物伦理学已经走到了死胡同，特别是在它对社会政治实践的影响方面，我的目标是表明实用主义能够通过关注它的一些形而上学和认识论原则来改善辩论。这与理论哲学最近的一些发展是一致的;然而，要点应该是承认人类是真正实用的生物，这意味着生物不能不行动，因此应该努力表现得更好。情感哲学现在充当了通常被理解为属于理论哲学的问题和被认为属于实践哲学领域的问题之间的中介。事实上，在最近的研究中，关于经验的本质和情感在其中的作用的实用主义思想与当代情感概念之间的重要相似之处已经出现。我想用这些来说明一个例子，支持在皮尔士和杜威那里可以找到的古典实用主义的统一概念。我将继续重建和批评情感在他们各自作品中的作用。接下来，我将探讨伦理学中的相关问题（例如，伦理学如何影响个人规范性判断以及如何受个人规范性判断影响的问题）和元伦理学中的相关问题（重要的是关于实用主义的元伦理现实主义的问题）。除此之外，尽管社会和政治制度对于成功的行动（和探究）的重要性是公认的，但在皮尔士和杜威那里都存在一种非常有趣的动力，强调个人（准美德）行为的重要性，这似乎也与情感的作用有关;然而，需要更详细的分析。最后，就我的整个项目而言，利用这个研究奖学金对我来说至关重要，以便更准确地陈述我的一些方法论承诺。

It is well known that classical philosophical pragmatism claimed being able to focus philosophical inquiry on supposedly real problems, and by doing so to improve human experience in the broadest sense. The success of this endeavor relied on its conception of how thought and action were inherently linked. Moreover, classical pragmatism is also known for a certain unorthodox approach towards the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, e.g. championing a (notorious) primacy of practice. At the same time there is little consensus on whether there is a unity to be found across the different pragmatist works. Especially, when it comes to practical philosophy, the implications of pragmatism are indeed an open question; and the problems arising from human-animal-relations are a very good example. Hence, inasmuch as mainstream academic animal ethics has reached a dead end, in particular with respect to its impact on sociopolitical practices, it is my aim to show that pragmatism is in a position to improve the debates by focusing on some of its metaphysical and epistemological tenets. This is in tune with some of the recent developments in theoretical philosophy; however, the gist should be acknowledging humans as genuinely pragmatic creatures, which means creatures who cannot but act and who, as it were, should therefore try to act better. The philosophy of emotion now acts as an intermediary between questions that are usually understood to belong to theoretical philosophy and those that are seen to fall into the sphere of practical philosophy. In fact, in recent research important similarities between pragmatist ideas, concerning the nature of experience and the role of emotions therein, and contemporary conceptions of emotions have emerged. I want to use these in order to construe a case in favor of a unitary conception of the classical pragmatism that can be found in Peirce and Dewey. I will proceed by reconstructing and criticizing the role of emotions in their respective works. Next, I will inquire into the related problems in ethics (e.g. with respect to the question of how ethics can influence and can be influenced by individual normative judgment) and in metaethics (importantly with respect to the question of a pragmatic metaethical realism). On top of that, notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of social and political institutions for succesful actions (and inquiry), there is a very interesting momentum present both in Peirce and Dewey that stresses the importance of individual (quasi-virtuous) conduct, which seems to be related to the role of emotions as well; however, a more detailed analysis is needed. Finally, with respect to my project as a whole it is of utmost importance to me to use this research fellowship in order to state some of my methodological commitments more precisely.