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Towards a Multidimensional Theory of Wisdom

Towards a Multidimensional Theory of Wisdom
迈向多维智慧理论
批准号:
290376333
负责人:
Professor Dr. Gerhard Schönrich
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
德国
项目类别:
Research Grants
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
德国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
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英文摘要
The basic concept of this project, which is primarily based in the field of normative epistemology, is the concept of a wise decision, from which further central concepts of wisdom such as personal wisdom or wisdom as a value will be construed. The main benefit of this account consists in providing an independently measurable concept of personal wisdom which is specifically useful for further empirical research. The project is divided into three major fields of work:(1) Under what conditions can a decision characterized as being wise? We are going to develop a definition of wise decisions within a broader framework of a contextualist theory of wisdom attributions. We also develop a distinction between two kinds of wisdom attributions, namely attributive and adverbial attributions.(2) Traditional as well as current theories of wisdom usually address the concept of personal wisdom exclusively. While such competing approaches try to define personal wisdom directly in terms of cognitive and other personal characteristics, we go the opposite way and define a wise person as a person who has the disposition to decide wisely. This approach is reductive insofar as it bases the concept of a wise person on the concept of wise decisions. The key advantage consists in being able to operationalize both aspects independently from each other, which provides a superior base especially for empirically oriented theories of personal wisdom.(3) The third project area aims to explain the epistemic value of wisdom. While the practical value of wisdom is often referred to especially in the field of ethics, the epistemic value of wisdom is highly underexposed in the current epistemological discussion. What is discussed instead are rather the concepts of justification, knowledge or, most recently, understanding. This preemphasis is, according to our view, not sufficiently founded. We argue that one of the goals of science and epistemic practice in general is to make significant contributions to the improvement of our current situation. This is exactly as we define wise decisions. Wisdom is, among other things, epistemically valuable because it is one of the capacities we aim for when doing science; and it can as such not be reduced to other things such as truth, justification, or knowledge.
期刊论文(7)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Epistemische Deferenz
认知尊重
DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000045
发表时间: 2018
期刊: Grazer Philosophische Studien
影响因子: --
作者: [Hauswald]
通讯作者: Hauswald
External Goals and Inherent Norms – A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity
外部目标和内在规范——认知规范性的集群概念
DOI: 10.1515/9783110496765-016
发表时间: 2016
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Schmechtig]
通讯作者: Schmechtig
The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion
认知价值的客观性和来自沉浸的论证
DOI: 10.1515/9783110524055-009
发表时间: 2017
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Schönrich]
通讯作者: Schönrich
Kant’s Concept of Dignity
康德的尊严观
DOI: 10.1515/9783110661491
发表时间: 2019
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Schönrich, Y. (eds.)]
通讯作者: Y. (eds.)
7
    Erklärung und Analyse epistemischer Werte
    • 批准号:
      206675766
    • 项目类别:
      Research Grants
    • 资助金额:
      $0.0万
    • 财政年份:
      2012
    • 负责人:
      Professor Dr. Gerhard Schönrich
    • 依托单位:
    海外基金