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Towards a Multidimensional Theory of Wisdom

迈向多维智慧理论

基本信息

批准号：
290376333
负责人：
Professor Dr. Gerhard Schönrich
金额：
--
依托单位：
Professur für Theoretische Philosophie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/290376333?language=en
关键词：
Towards Multidimensional Theory Wisdom

项目摘要

The basic concept of this project, which is primarily based in the field of normative epistemology, is the concept of a wise decision, from which further central concepts of wisdom such as personal wisdom or wisdom as a value will be construed. The main benefit of this account consists in providing an independently measurable concept of personal wisdom which is specifically useful for further empirical research. The project is divided into three major fields of work:(1) Under what conditions can a decision characterized as being wise? We are going to develop a definition of wise decisions within a broader framework of a contextualist theory of wisdom attributions. We also develop a distinction between two kinds of wisdom attributions, namely attributive and adverbial attributions.(2) Traditional as well as current theories of wisdom usually address the concept of personal wisdom exclusively. While such competing approaches try to define personal wisdom directly in terms of cognitive and other personal characteristics, we go the opposite way and define a wise person as a person who has the disposition to decide wisely. This approach is reductive insofar as it bases the concept of a wise person on the concept of wise decisions. The key advantage consists in being able to operationalize both aspects independently from each other, which provides a superior base especially for empirically oriented theories of personal wisdom.(3) The third project area aims to explain the epistemic value of wisdom. While the practical value of wisdom is often referred to especially in the field of ethics, the epistemic value of wisdom is highly underexposed in the current epistemological discussion. What is discussed instead are rather the concepts of justification, knowledge or, most recently, understanding. This preemphasis is, according to our view, not sufficiently founded. We argue that one of the goals of science and epistemic practice in general is to make significant contributions to the improvement of our current situation. This is exactly as we define wise decisions. Wisdom is, among other things, epistemically valuable because it is one of the capacities we aim for when doing science; and it can as such not be reduced to other things such as truth, justification, or knowledge.

这个项目的基本概念主要基于规范认识论领域，是明智决策的概念，从这个概念中可以进一步解释智慧的中心概念，如个人智慧或智慧作为一种价值。这个帐户的主要好处在于提供了一个独立的可测量的个人智慧的概念，这是特别有用的进一步的实证研究。该项目分为三个主要领域的工作：（1）在什么条件下可以被称为明智的决定？我们将在智慧归因的语境主义理论的更广泛的框架内，对明智的决定进行定义。我们还区分了两种智慧属性，即定语和状语。(2)传统的和当前的智慧理论通常只涉及个人智慧的概念。虽然这些相互竞争的方法试图直接从认知和其他个人特征的角度来定义个人智慧，但我们走的是相反的道路，将明智的人定义为具有明智决定倾向的人。这种方法是简化的，因为它将智者的概念建立在明智决策的概念之上。关键的优势在于能够操作这两个方面独立于对方，这提供了一个上级的基础，特别是经验导向的理论的个人智慧。(3)第三个项目领域旨在解释智慧的认识价值。虽然智慧的实用价值经常被提及，特别是在伦理学领域，但智慧的认识价值在当前的认识论讨论中却高度暴露。相反，这里讨论的是称义、知识或最近的理解的概念。我们认为，这种预先强调没有充分的根据。我们认为，科学和认识实践的目标之一，一般是作出重大贡献，以改善我们的现状。这正是我们所定义的明智决策。除其他外，智慧在认识上是有价值的，因为它是我们在从事科学时所追求的能力之一;它本身不能被简化为真理、理由或知识等其他东西。