The fair division of losses

该项目旨在审查个人和公司行为者的分配问题。当前的新型冠状病毒肺炎（COVID 19，即2019冠状病毒病）危机令人震惊地表明，在许多现实生活中，不仅收益需要分配，而且（货币）成本、（卫生纸的短缺，或者更糟糕的是，消毒器或重症监护病房的短缺）往往也需要分配损失。这就提出了一个问题：在必须分担损失的情况下，行为者如何决定？是什么影响了他们的行为？前体项目的研究工具已证明其有用性，因此应保留。这意味着我们继续将联合收割机博弈论与前景理论的假设相结合，并将其应用于最后通牒博弈（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG），以进一步研究公平在谈判损失中的作用。在我们之前的项目中，我们能够证明，在使用货币预付机制的实验中，损失是可以实际诱导的。我们发现，人们在一次性决策中对损失的慷慨程度低于在收益领域的类似决策。我们先前的研究结果表明，这种对公平规范的侵蚀是由于受试者的公平偏好（强制性规范）和我们对决策情境的实验操纵（描述性规范）的相互作用。首先，我们想进行一系列的一次性决策实验，这些实验是为先例项目安排的，即在损失域中有可能受到制裁的一次性决策。众所周知，制裁的（代价高昂的）可能性已经增加了合作（这里：公平）行为，而且没有实际执行制裁。然而，这绝不是微不足道的领域的损失。在这里，代价高昂的制裁不会导致进一步的利润损失-就像实验室实验中通常的情况那样-而是导致额外的损失。这使得制裁以及稳定公平规范在理论上不太可能。公平决策中的规范研究受到新冠肺炎危机的阻碍，因为它被禁止进行实验室实验。第二，我们想评估当期望发生变化时，重复决策中公平规范的鲁棒性。我们预计，最初强大的公平的决定将随着时间的推移而改变，如果受试者的期望，其他科目的行为（描述性规范）已被证明是错误的。在这方面，我们已进行了一项试验性研究，重复DG。这项研究表明，经验表明，在这两个领域，收益和损失，公平规范侵蚀时，反复作出的决定。此外，损失域中的行为动力学不同于收益域中的行为动力学。在这项后续研究中，我们希望系统地研究这些发现，使用我们以前描述的理论和方法的工具，在一个实验系列重复UG和DG。

This project aims at the examination of distribution problems of individual and corporate actors. The current Covid 19 crisis strikingly shows that in many real-life situations not only gains need to be divided, but that often (monetary) costs, shortage (of toilet paper, or worse, of respirators or intensive care units), say losses are to be divided. This raises the question: How do actors decide in situations in which losses have to be divided and what influences their behavior?The research tools of the precursor project have proven their utility and shall therefore be retained. This means that we continue to combine Game Theory with assumptions of the Prospect Theory and apply it to Ultimatum Games (UG) and Dictator Games (DG) to further investigate the role of fairness in bargaining over losses. In our previous project, we were able to show that losses can be realistically induced in experiments using a monetary prepaid mechanism. We showed that people are less generous in one-shot decisions over losses as in similar decisions in the domain of gains. Our previous findings indicate that this eroding of the fairness norm is due to an interaction of subjects’ fairness preferences (injunctive norm) and our experimental manipulation of the decision situation (descriptive norm).In this follow-up project we want to pursue this approach on two tracks. First, we want to conduct the series of experiments on one-shot decisions that had been scheduled for the precedent project, namely one-shot decisions in the loss domain with the possibility of sanctions. It is well known that already the (costly) possibility of sanctions increase cooperative (here: fair) behavior, and that without having the sanctions actually being executed. However, this is by no means trivial for the domain of losses. Costly sanctions here do not lead to further lost profits - as is usually the case in laboratory experiments - but to additional losses. This makes sanctions and thus the stabilization of the fairness norm theoretically less likely. The investigation of norms in fair decisions was prevented by the Covid 19 crisis since it was inhibited to conduct laboratory experiments.Second, we want to evaluate the robustness of the fairness norm in repeated decisions when expectations are changed. We expect that initially robust fair decisions will change over time if subjects’ expectations regarding the behavior of other subjects (descriptive norm) have been proved wrong. In this regard, we already conducted a pilot study with repeated DG. This study shows empirically that in both domains, gains and losses, fairness norms erode when decisions are made repeatedly. Furthermore, the behavioral dynamics in the loss domain differ from those in the domain of gains. In this follow-up study we want to systematically examine these findings using our previously described theoretical and methodological instruments in an experimental series with repeated UG and DG.