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The fair division of losses

损失的公平分配

基本信息

批准号：
362787969
负责人：
Professor Dr. Roger Berger
金额：
--
依托单位：
Lehrstuhl Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2016-12-31 至 2021-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/362787969?language=en
关键词：
fair division losses

项目摘要

This project aims at the examination of distribution problems of individual and corporate actors. The current Covid 19 crisis strikingly shows that in many real-life situations not only gains need to be divided, but that often (monetary) costs, shortage (of toilet paper, or worse, of respirators or intensive care units), say losses are to be divided. This raises the question: How do actors decide in situations in which losses have to be divided and what influences their behavior?The research tools of the precursor project have proven their utility and shall therefore be retained. This means that we continue to combine Game Theory with assumptions of the Prospect Theory and apply it to Ultimatum Games (UG) and Dictator Games (DG) to further investigate the role of fairness in bargaining over losses. In our previous project, we were able to show that losses can be realistically induced in experiments using a monetary prepaid mechanism. We showed that people are less generous in one-shot decisions over losses as in similar decisions in the domain of gains. Our previous findings indicate that this eroding of the fairness norm is due to an interaction of subjects’ fairness preferences (injunctive norm) and our experimental manipulation of the decision situation (descriptive norm).In this follow-up project we want to pursue this approach on two tracks. First, we want to conduct the series of experiments on one-shot decisions that had been scheduled for the precedent project, namely one-shot decisions in the loss domain with the possibility of sanctions. It is well known that already the (costly) possibility of sanctions increase cooperative (here: fair) behavior, and that without having the sanctions actually being executed. However, this is by no means trivial for the domain of losses. Costly sanctions here do not lead to further lost profits - as is usually the case in laboratory experiments - but to additional losses. This makes sanctions and thus the stabilization of the fairness norm theoretically less likely. The investigation of norms in fair decisions was prevented by the Covid 19 crisis since it was inhibited to conduct laboratory experiments.Second, we want to evaluate the robustness of the fairness norm in repeated decisions when expectations are changed. We expect that initially robust fair decisions will change over time if subjects’ expectations regarding the behavior of other subjects (descriptive norm) have been proved wrong. In this regard, we already conducted a pilot study with repeated DG. This study shows empirically that in both domains, gains and losses, fairness norms erode when decisions are made repeatedly. Furthermore, the behavioral dynamics in the loss domain differ from those in the domain of gains. In this follow-up study we want to systematically examine these findings using our previously described theoretical and methodological instruments in an experimental series with repeated UG and DG.

这个项目旨在审查个人和公司行为者的分配问题。当前的Covid - 19危机惊人地表明，在许多现实情况下，不仅需要分配收益，而且通常（货币）成本，短缺（卫生纸，或更糟糕的是，呼吸器或重症监护病房），说损失是要分割的。这就提出了一个问题：在必须分摊损失的情况下，参与者如何做出决定？是什么影响了他们的行为？前体项目的研究工具已证明其效用，因此应予以保留。这意味着我们继续将博弈论与前景理论的假设结合起来，并将其应用于最后通牒博弈（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG），以进一步研究公平在讨价还价中的作用。在我们之前的项目中，我们能够证明在使用货币预付机制的实验中可以现实地诱导损失。我们发现，人们在面对损失的一次性决策中，不像在面对收益的类似决策中那样慷慨。我们之前的研究结果表明，这种公平规范的侵蚀是由于被试的公平偏好（禁令规范）和我们对决策情境的实验操纵（描述性规范）的相互作用。在这个后续项目中，我们希望在两个方面采用这种方法。首先，我们希望对先前项目计划的一次性决策进行一系列实验，即损失域中具有制裁可能性的一次性决策。众所周知，制裁的（代价高昂的）可能性已经增加了合作（这里指的是公平）行为，而且没有实际执行制裁。然而，这对于损失的领域来说绝不是微不足道的。在这里，代价高昂的制裁不会导致进一步的利润损失——这通常是实验室实验的情况——而是导致额外的损失。这使得制裁，从而稳定公平规范在理论上不太可能。对公平决策规范的调查因新冠疫情而受阻，无法进行实验室实验。其次，我们想要评估当期望改变时，公平性规范在重复决策中的稳健性。如果被试对其他被试行为的期望（描述性规范）被证明是错误的，我们预计最初稳健的公平决策将随着时间的推移而改变。在这方面，我们已经与重复的DG进行了一项试点研究。本研究从经验上表明，在收益和损失这两个领域，当反复做出决策时，公平准则会受到侵蚀。此外，损失域的行为动力学与收益域的行为动力学不同。在这项后续研究中，我们希望在重复UG和DG的实验系列中使用我们先前描述的理论和方法工具系统地检查这些发现。