Design of Financial Governance (DEFIGO)

全球金融市场监管在发行领域和部门之间呈现出制度性差异。例如，银行的最低资本金要求由BCBS发起，BCBS是一个由央行行长组成的跨政府机构，而会计原则是由一个私人机构IASB制定的。一些机构，如政府间国际货币基金组织，颁布(更多)具有约束力的规则，而其他机构，如国际会计准则理事会，则依赖自愿监管。拟议的项目询问：(1)哪些制度设计可以区分？(2)制度变化是如何随着时间的推移而发展的？(3)我们如何解释制度设计的差异？(1)该项目分析了两个设计特征：(A)机构行为者的类型，以及(B)合法化。关于(A)，我们一方面区分公共和私人行为者，另一方面区分内阁级(非授权)或独立/行政(授权)行为者，产生四种类型的行为者形式：政府间、跨政府、跨国和跨国公私(PPP)。关于(B)，我们关注监管的硬性和软性。(2)我们制定了一个理论上知情的编码方案来衡量这两个属性，加上一些普遍感兴趣的机构特征，并为所有全球金融监管机构编制了新的财务治理设计数据集(DEFIGOD)，可以在六个不同的时间点(创始年、1963年、1980年、1998年、2007年和2015年)识别。基于这一数据集，该项目系统地测试了一些著名的描述性假设。(3)为了解释制度设计选择，我们提出了几个假设。(A)关于机构类型，我们考虑(1)经济实力，(2)国家监管机构的机构能力，(3)资源依赖性，和(4)政治机会的考虑。关于合法化，我们的假设是基于(I)可信承诺问题的严重性，(Ii)分配冲突的严重性，(Iii)机构设计者之间的权力差异和(Iv)各自问题领域的复杂性。在这些假设的基础上，我们开发了可以与感兴趣的两个结果相联系的条件。这一分析是以模糊集QCA的形式进行的。本项目对有关新治理模式和法制化的文献进行了贡献，并将其扩展到全球金融治理领域。这些领域的工作大多是单一的案例研究或集中在少数案例上。相比之下，该项目的目的是在大量案例的基础上进行系统的实证分析。其次，尽管关于全球金融的IPE文献的很大一部分描述了国际金融监管的缺陷，但缺乏对这些弱点的政治决定因素的系统分析，但这是该项目的中心舞台，应该有助于重新监管全球金融的任何努力。

Global financial market regulation exhibits institutional variation across issue areas and sectors. For example, minimum capital requirements for banks are sponsored by the BCBS, a transgovernmental body of central bankers, while accounting principles are developed by a private body, the IASB. Some institutions, like the intergovernmental IMF promulgate (more) binding rules, while others, like the IASB rely on voluntary regulations. The proposed project asks: (1) which institutional designs can be distinguished? (2) How has institutional variation developed over time? (3) How can we explain the variance of institutional design?(1) The project analyzes two design features: (a) types of institutional actors, and (b) legalization. With respect to (a) we distinguish between public and private actors on the one hand and cabinet level (non-delegated) or independent/administrative (delegated) actors on the other, yielding four types of actor forms: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, transnational, and transnational public-private (PPP). With respect to (b) we focus on the hardness and softness of regulations.(2) We develop a theoretically informed coding scheme to measure these two attributes, plus a number of institutional features of general interest and compile a new Design of Financial Governance Dataset (DEFIGOD) for all institutions of global financial regulation that can be identified at six different points in time (founding year, 1963, 1980, 1998, 2007 and 2015). Based on this dataset the project systematically tests a number of well-known descriptive hypotheses. (3) In order to explain the institutional design choices, we develop several hypotheses. (a) With respect to institutional type, we look at (i) economic power, (ii) institutional capacity of national regulatory bodies, (iii) resource dependence, and (iv) considerations of political opportunity. Concerning legalization, our hypotheses are based on (i) the severity of credible commitment problems, (ii) the severity of distributive conflict, (iii) power differentials among institutional designers and (iv) complexity of the respective issue area. On the basis of these hypotheses we develop conditions that can be linked to the two outcomes of interest. The analysis is carried out as a fuzzy-set QCA.This project contributes to the literatures on new modes of governance and on legalization and extends them to the realm of global financial governance. Works in these areas have mostly been single case studies or focused on a small number of cases. In contrast, the project aims at a systematic empirical analysis on the basis of a large number of cases. Second, while a significant part of the IPE literature on global finance describes the shortcomings of international financial regulation, systematic analysis of the political determinants of these weaknesses is lacking, but is center-stage in this project and should be instrumental in any effort to re-regulate global finance.