Policy-Making in Coalition Governments: The Enactment of Coalition Agreements (COALITIONPOLICY)
Policy-Making in Coalition Governments: The Enactment of Coalition Agreements (COALITIONPOLICY)
批准号:
390778998
负责人:
Professorin Dr. Heike Klüver
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
德国
项目类别:
Research Grants
财政年份:
2018
资助国家:
德国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2017-12-31 至 2021-12-31
中文摘要
为什么联合政府(不)遵守他们在联合政府协议中做出的政策承诺?在联合政府接管行政办公室之前,他们通常会进行密集的联盟谈判,并公布一份全面的联盟协议,在协议中,他们详细说明了他们计划在政府中实施的政策改革。尽管这些联盟协议不具有法律约束力,但它们重要地约束了内阁政党的行为,因为联盟政党可能会因不遵守联盟协议中做出的承诺而受到公开指责。然而,之前的案例研究证据表明,在联合政府协议中承诺的所有政策改革中,只有大约三分之二得到了实际实施。尽管联盟协议对多党内阁在任期间的立法行为具有核心重要性,但文献主要致力于研究联盟内阁的形成和生存,而我们对多党内阁在任期间制定政策的了解仍然很少。因此,我们的目标是通过追求两个主要目标来弥合文献中的这一重要差距。首先,我们将建立一个全面的理论框架,将联盟协议的颁布概念化为一个同时受到内阁内部因素(显着性、冲突、偏好切线、讨价还价能力)和外部因素(舆论、经济表现、机构否决权)影响的过程。其次,我们将通过编制一个新的、全面的数据集来检验我们的理论预期,该数据集是关于从2000年到2015年24个西欧和东欧国家的多党内阁谈判达成的100多项联盟协议的颁布情况,并将这个新的数据集与内阁特征、民意、经济表现和机构特征的信息结合起来。了解(不)遵守联合政府协议中所作政策承诺的原因,不仅对于理解多党内阁--欧洲各国最常见的政府类型--的政策制定如何运作具有重要意义,而且对于更广泛的政治代表性也具有重要意义,因为选民在很大程度上是根据政府的执政表现来评价政府的。
英文摘要
Why do coalition governments (not) comply with the policy commitments they have made in coalition agreements? Before coalition governments take over executive offices, they typically engage in intensive coalition negotiations and publish a comprehensive coalition agreement in which they provide a detailed account of the policy reforms they plan to enact in government. Even though these coalition agreements are not legally binding, they importantly constrain the behaviour of cabinet parties as coalition parties can be publicly blamed for not complying with the promises they have made in the coalition agreement. However, previous case study evidence shows that only about two thirds of all the policy reforms promised in coalition agreements were actually enacted. Despite the central importance of coalition agreements for the legislative behaviour of multiparty cabinets during their time of office, the literature has been primarily devoted to studying the formation and the survival of coalition cabinets while our knowledge about policy-making in multiparty cabinets during their time of office is still scarce. We therefore aim to close this important gap in the literature by pursuing two major objectives. First, we will develop a comprehensive theoretical framework that conceptualizes the enactment of coalition agreements as a process that is simultaneously affected by internal cabinet factors (salience, conflict, preference tangentiality, bargaining power) and external factors (public opinion, economic performance, institutional veto-players). Second, we will test our theoretical expectations by compiling a new and comprehensive dataset on the enactment of more than 100 coalition agreements negotiated by multiparty cabinets in 24 West and East European countries from 2000 until 2015 and by combining this novel dataset with information on cabinet features, public opinion, economic performance and institutional characteristics. Understanding the reasons for (non) compliance with the policy commitments made in coalition agreements does not only have important implications for understanding how policy-making in multiparty cabinets - which are the most frequent type of government across European countries - works, but also for political representation more generally as voters evaluate governments to a large extent based on their performance in office.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Bringing policies back in: Explaining payoff allocation in coalition governments
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批准号:244626236
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项目类别:Research Grants
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2014
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负责人:Professorin Dr. Heike Klüver
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依托单位:
Interest Groups and the Ministerial Bureaucracy in Germany: Studying lobbying success at the administrative stage (MINISTERIALLOBBY)
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批准号:455518367
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项目类别:Research Grants
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:--
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负责人:Professorin Dr. Heike Klüver
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Scalable Learning and Optimization: High-dimensional Models and Online Decision-Making Strategies for Big Data Analysis
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批准号:--
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项目类别:合作创新研究团队
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:姚韬
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依托单位: