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Bringing policies back in: Explaining payoff allocation in coalition governments

恢复政策：解释联合政府的收益分配

基本信息

批准号：
244626236
负责人：
Professorin Dr. Heike Klüver
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2013-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/244626236?language=en
关键词：
Bringing policies back Explaining payoff

项目摘要

How do coalition parties allocate payoffs? To what extent do political parties get what they want in terms of their programmatic stance and with regard to ministerial portfolios when they enter a coalition government? Political parties forming a coalition government join forces for the purpose of entering government, but they pursue different policy objectives and compete for offices. Coalition parties therefore have to come to an agreement with regard to policies that should be implemented during the time of office and with regard to the allocation of ministerial posts. At the beginning of the legislative term, coalition parties therefore engage in intensive bargaining. They negotiate the allocation of ministerial posts and formulate a coalition agreement that sets out the policy priorities for the upcoming term. While the literature on coalition governments has devoted considerable attention to explaining which parties are likely to form coalitions and to predicting the allocation of ministerial portfolios (see e.g. Laver & Schofield 1990; Laver & Shepsle 1996; Martin & Stevenson 2001), the allocation of policy payoffs has largely been neglected. Since understanding how policies and offices are distributed in coalition governments has crucial implications for political representation and the responsiveness of policy-makers to citizens, we aim at filling this important gap in the literature. We pursue two major goals in this research project: First, we will develop a theoretical framework that conceptualizes coalition negotiations as a two-dimensional process in which parties simultaneously bargain about the allocation of policy benefits and ministerial portfolios. Second, we will empirically test our theoretical expectations by compiling a novel dataset on policy payoff allocation that is based on a content analysis of coalition agreements negotiated by more than 400 coalition governments in 27 West and East European countries and by combining this new dataset with information on portfolio allocation, cabinet and party characteristics.

联合政党如何分配收益？当政党进入联合政府时，他们在纲领立场和部长职务方面能在多大程度上得到他们想要的？组成联合政府的政党为了进入政府而联合起来，但他们追求不同的政策目标并争夺职位。因此，联盟党必须就任职期间应执行的政策以及部长职位的分配达成协议。因此，在立法任期之初，联合政党就会进行密集的讨价还价。他们就部长职位的分配进行谈判，并制定联合协议，规定下一任期的政策优先事项。尽管有关联合政府的文献相当多地关注解释哪些政党可能组成联合政府以及预测部长职务的分配（参见 Laver & Schofield 1990；Laver & Shepsle 1996；Martin & Stevenson 2001），但政策收益的分配在很大程度上被忽视了。由于了解联合政府中政策和办公室的分配方式对于政治代表性和决策者对公民的响应能力具有至关重要的影响，因此我们的目标是填补文献中的这一重要空白。我们在这个研究项目中追求两个主要目标：首先，我们将开发一个理论框架，将联合谈判概念化为一个二维过程，各方同时就政策利益和部长职务的分配进行讨价还价。其次，我们将根据对 27 个西欧和东欧国家 400 多个联合政府谈判达成的联合协议的内容分析，编制一个关于政策收益分配的新数据集，并通过将这个新数据集与投资组合分配、内阁和政党特征等信息相结合，来实证检验我们的理论预期。