Contextual-Epistemic 2D Semantics, the Cogito-A Priori, and the Problem of Intentionality

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Many mental states represent features of the world, that is to say, they have contents. Philosophical theories that aim to explain how mental states come to have contents are called theories of intentionality, and theories that aim to characterize these contents are called theories of mental content.The central aim of the project is to develop an account that integrates a theory of mental content into a theory of intentionality. The basis for this account is a new kind of two-dimensionalist theory of mental content that connects contents with what I call the cogito-a priori, which corresponds to what a subject can know without receiving any sensory input. What is cogito-a priori for an individual, then, promises to explain how the mental states of a subject come to have contents.