Internalist Theories of Intentionality and Modal Cognition

意向性理论试图解释信仰和欲望等心理状态能够与世界相关的东西。在很长一段时间里，内在论理论一直占据主导地位，根据这种理论，精神状态的内容完全由一个人的大脑中发生的事情决定。然而，在过去的几十年里，外在论的描述变得流行起来，这表明这些内容也取决于外部环境。内在论的衰落伴随着另一种传统观点的衰落，根据这种观点，模态事实，即关于什么是可能或必要的事实，可以通过纯粹的先验的非经验手段来了解。研究项目的第一个目标是调查这两篇论文之间的关系。在那之后，一个与我们对模态事实的先验访问相兼容的内在论的描述的可行性将被检验。

Theories of intentionality try to explain in virtue of what mental states such as beliefs and desires are capable of relating to the world. For a long time, internalist theories had been dominant, according to which the contents of mental states are completely determined by what occurs inside a person's head. In previous decades, however, externalist accounts have become prevalent, which state that these contents also depend on external circumstances. The decline of internalism was accompanied by that of another traditional view, according to which modal facts, i.e., facts about what is possible or necessary, can be known by non-empirical means, purely a priori. The first goal of the research project is to investigate the relation between these two theses. After that, the viability of an internalist account that is compatible with our having a priori access to modal facts will be examined.