The Rise of Emerging Powers: A Challenge to Norms of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries?

新兴大国日益增长的经济重要性改变了国际政治中的力量平衡。权力向新兴国家的转移是否对塑造全球秩序的西方规范构成了根本性挑战，受到了学术界的极大关注(Ikenberry，2011；Kupchan，2012；Steinfeld，2010)。然而，我们感兴趣的是，巴西、中国和印度(BIC)的崛起对依赖南北二元区分的规范意味着什么。为了解决这个问题，我们试图了解巴西、中国和印度的崛起是通过什么条件和机制加强或削弱为发展中国家作为一个群体提供差别待遇的全球规范的。传统观点认为，全球南方经济的进一步分化使一刀切的差别待遇准则失去了合法性，这些准则为整个发展中国家集团提供了特权准入、财政补偿或免除义务。但新兴大国是继续站在发展中国家的讨价还价联盟一边捍卫这种二元做法，还是与发达国家联手，还是创建一个自己的全新集团，这仍然是一个悬而未决的经验问题。我们的研究不仅试图审查这些可能性中的哪一种，而且还试图审查新兴国家的议价能力通过哪些条件和机制形成所谓的发展中国家作为一个群体的差别待遇规范的消亡。通过这样做，它直接涉及到关于历史上发展起来的南北关系作为21世纪全球政治的核心结构原则是否(不)继续具有相关性的辩论。从理论上讲，我们汇集了两篇很少相互交流的文献的重要见解：关于规范如何变化的建构主义研究，以及关于国际制度复合体的动态和后果的制度主义研究。在这两条线索的基础上，我们假设，巴西、中国和印度的讨价还价行为是加强还是削弱了发展中国家的差别待遇规范，一方面取决于存在于共同规范信念和制度机会结构层面的因素。为了衡量针对发展中国家的差别待遇规范的力度，我们评估了它们的普及性、范围和法律质量。我们通过深入研究贸易和气候制度的规范动态来检验我们的模型，这两个重要的政策领域过去南北政治发挥了关键作用。我们考察了世界贸易体系中的特殊和差别待遇规范，以及气候制度中的共同但有区别的责任规范。为了加强我们的分析的解释力，我们将协变分析与过程跟踪相结合。

The growing economic importance of emerging powers alters the balance of power in international politics. Whether or not the power shift towards emerging countries presents a fundamental challenge to the Western norms that shape global order has received much scholarly attention (Ikenberry 2011; Kupchan 2012; Steinfeld 2010). Yet, our interest is in what the rise of Brazil, China and India (BICs) means for norms that rely on a binary North-South distinction. Addressing this question, we seek to understand the conditions and mechanisms through which the rise of Brazil, China and India either strengthens or weakens global norms that provide differential treatment to developing countries as a group. Conventional wisdom suggests that greater economic fragmentation amongst the Global South delegitimizes a one-size-fits-all approach to norms of differential treatment, which provide the entire group of developing countries with privileged access, financial compensation or exemptions from obligations. But it remains an open empirical question whether emerging powers continue to side with developing country bargaining coalitions in defense of this binary approach, join forces with developed countries or create an entirely new grouping of their own. Our research seeks to examine not only which of these possibilities prevails, but also the conditions and mechanisms through which the bargaining power of emerging countries shapes the alleged demise of norms of differential treatment for developing countries as a group. In doing so, it speaks directly to the debates about the (dis)continued relevance of historically grown North-South relations as a central structuring principle of global politics in the 21st century. Theoretically, we bring together key insights from two literatures that rarely speak to each other: constructivist research on how norms change and institutionalist research on the dynamics and consequences of international regime complexes. Building on these two strands, we assume that whether the bargaining behavior of Brazil, China and India strengthens or weakens norms of differential treatment for developing countries depends on factors that exist at the levels of shared normative beliefs on the one hand and of institutional opportunity structures on the other. To measure the strength of differential treatment norms for developing countries, we assess their pervasiveness, scope and legal quality. We test our model through an in-depth examination of the normative dynamics in the trade and climate regimes, two important policy realms in which North-South politics have played a key role in the past. We look at the norm of Special and Differential Treatment in the world trading system, and the norm of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in the climate regime. To strengthen the explanatory power of our analysis we combine co-variational analysis with process-tracing.