Reverse Revolving Doors Revisited: On Bankers and Regulators

我们将调查金融业高管是否、为何以及在何种条件下寻求监管机构的雇佣。了解这个就业市场的机制，对于促进从国家监管机制向稳定的欧洲银行业联盟（European Banking Union）的高效和有效过渡，以及在目标冲突和由此产生的寻租行为未被发现的情况下避免金融不稳定，具有极其重要的意义。金融行业监管人员的任命被称为“旋转门现象”。反过来，我们的重点是转投监管机构的高管。金融业的经验可以促进人力资本在技术问题上的制度性积累，从而提高监管的质量。然而，以往的行业经历可能会促使企业偏离社会最优结果。与金融业前雇主的关系可能会使政策制定者更容易任人唯亲和受到监管。我们确定了这些对立力量的相对重要性及其原因，并提出了两个关于反向旋转门的具体问题：监管部门就业机会的可用性是否影响银行家的职业选择？监管机构过去在受监管实体中的经验如何影响规则的实施和/或设计（例如，在复杂性方面）？欧洲国家和超国家当局之间的互动提供了一个完美的试验场。鉴于当前现象的高度内生性质，我们使用了一种差异中的差异方法，我们在外生冲击方面暴露了一系列替代识别策略，以解释银行家作为监管者的就业能力。作为对就业能力的负面外生冲击，我们利用他们的银行被纳入单一监管机制（SSM）监管的机构名单。其次，我们使用银行SSM状态的交错变化，因为系统相关银行的集合随着时间的推移而变化。第三，我们利用2014年1月1日生效的资本要求指令（CRD IV）下奖金上限的引入，以确定合规和不合规银行高管之间潜在的就业能力差异影响。第四，为了评估旋转门现象对监管和规则制定活动的重要性，我们将利用欧洲国家交错引入的所谓冷静期，这限制了公务员向私营部门的转移。冷却期的引入从外部增加了银行和监管部门之间劳动力流动的摩擦，并可用于差异中的差异方法。总而言之，拟议中的分析可以揭示银行家与其监管机构之间挥之不去的关系对福利的影响。

We investigate if, why, and under which conditions senior executives from the financial industry seek employment with supervisory authorities. Understanding the mechanics of this job market is of eminent importance to facilitate the efficient and effective transition from national supervisory regimes towards a stable European Banking Union and avoid financial instability if goal conflicts and resulting rent seeking goes undetected. The appointment of supervisors in the financial industry is known as the revolving doors phenomenon. Our focus, in turn, is on executives that migrate to the regulator. Experience in the financial industry may facilitate the institutional accumulation of human capital on technical matters, thereby improving the quality of supervision and regulation. Yet, previous industry spells may entail incentives to deviate from socially optimal outcomes. Bonds with former employers in the financial industry may render policy makers more prone to cronyism and regulatory capture. We identify the relative importance of these opposing forces and its causes and ask two specific questions concerning reverse revolving doors: Does the availability of employment opportunities in the regulatory sector affect bankers' career choices? How do regulators' past experiences in regulated entities affect the implementation and/or the design of rules (e.g., in terms of complexity)?The interaction of national and supranational authorities in Europe provides a perfect testing ground. Given the highly endogenous nature of the phenomena at hand, we use a difference-in-difference methodology that we expose to a menu of alternative identification strategies in terms of exogenous shocks to explain banker’s employability as regulators. As a negative exogenous shock to employability, we exploit their bank’s inclusion into the list of institutions subject to supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Second, we use staggered changes of bank SSM status as the set of systemically relevant banks changed over time. Third, we exploit the introduction of bonus caps under Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) that came into force on January 1, 2014 to identify potential differential employability effects between compliant and non-compliant bank executives. Fourth, to evaluate the importance of the revolving doors phenomenon on supervisory and rule-making activity, we will exploit the staggered introduction of so-called cooling-off periods across European countries, which restrict civil servants moves to the private sector. The introduction of cooling-off periods exogenously increases frictions in worker flows between the banking and the regulatory sector, and can be used in a difference-in-differences approach. All in all, the proposed analysis can shed light on the welfare implications of lingering relationships between bankers and their supervisors.