Reverse Revolving Doors Revisited: On Bankers and Regulators

我们调查金融行业的高级管理人员是否、为什么以及在什么情况下寻求监管机构的工作。了解这一就业市场的机制，对于促进从国家监管制度向稳定的欧洲银行业联盟的高效和有效过渡，以及在目标冲突和由此产生的寻租未被发现的情况下避免金融不稳定，具有极其重要的意义。金融行业监管者的任命被称为旋转门现象。反过来，我们的重点是那些移居监管机构的高管。金融行业的经验可以促进人力资本在技术问题上的制度性积累，从而提高监督和监管的质量。然而，以前的行业周期可能会导致偏离社会最优结果的激励。与金融业前雇主建立联系，可能会让政策制定者更容易任人唯亲，更容易被监管机构俘虏。我们确定了这些对立力量的相对重要性及其原因，并就反向旋转门提出了两个具体问题：监管部门就业机会的可获得性是否会影响银行家的职业选择？监管机构过去在受监管实体中的经验如何影响规则的实施和/或规则的设计(例如，在复杂性方面)？欧洲国家和超国家当局的互动提供了一个完美的试验场。鉴于当前现象的高度内生性，我们使用差异性方法，根据外生冲击，我们暴露于一系列可选的识别策略，以解释银行家作为监管者的受雇能力。作为对就业能力的负面外生冲击，我们利用了他们的银行被列入单一监管机制(SSM)监管机构名单的机会。其次，我们使用银行SSM状态的交错变化作为一组具有系统相关性的银行随着时间的变化而变化。第三，我们利用2014年1月1日生效的资本要求指令(CRD IV)引入的奖金上限，来识别合规和不合规的银行高管之间潜在的就业能力差异影响。第四，为了评估旋转门现象对监管和规则制定活动的重要性，我们将利用欧洲各国交错引入所谓冷静期的机会，这种冷静期限制公务员进入私营部门。引入冷静期外在地增加了银行业和监管部门之间的劳动力流动的摩擦，并可用于差异中的方法。总而言之，拟议中的分析可以揭示银行家和他们的监管者之间挥之不去的关系对福利的影响。

We investigate if, why, and under which conditions senior executives from the financial industry seek employment with supervisory authorities. Understanding the mechanics of this job market is of eminent importance to facilitate the efficient and effective transition from national supervisory regimes towards a stable European Banking Union and avoid financial instability if goal conflicts and resulting rent seeking goes undetected. The appointment of supervisors in the financial industry is known as the revolving doors phenomenon. Our focus, in turn, is on executives that migrate to the regulator. Experience in the financial industry may facilitate the institutional accumulation of human capital on technical matters, thereby improving the quality of supervision and regulation. Yet, previous industry spells may entail incentives to deviate from socially optimal outcomes. Bonds with former employers in the financial industry may render policy makers more prone to cronyism and regulatory capture. We identify the relative importance of these opposing forces and its causes and ask two specific questions concerning reverse revolving doors: Does the availability of employment opportunities in the regulatory sector affect bankers' career choices? How do regulators' past experiences in regulated entities affect the implementation and/or the design of rules (e.g., in terms of complexity)?The interaction of national and supranational authorities in Europe provides a perfect testing ground. Given the highly endogenous nature of the phenomena at hand, we use a difference-in-difference methodology that we expose to a menu of alternative identification strategies in terms of exogenous shocks to explain banker’s employability as regulators. As a negative exogenous shock to employability, we exploit their bank’s inclusion into the list of institutions subject to supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Second, we use staggered changes of bank SSM status as the set of systemically relevant banks changed over time. Third, we exploit the introduction of bonus caps under Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) that came into force on January 1, 2014 to identify potential differential employability effects between compliant and non-compliant bank executives. Fourth, to evaluate the importance of the revolving doors phenomenon on supervisory and rule-making activity, we will exploit the staggered introduction of so-called cooling-off periods across European countries, which restrict civil servants moves to the private sector. The introduction of cooling-off periods exogenously increases frictions in worker flows between the banking and the regulatory sector, and can be used in a difference-in-differences approach. All in all, the proposed analysis can shed light on the welfare implications of lingering relationships between bankers and their supervisors.