Reverse Revolving Doors Revisited: On Bankers and Regulators

我们调查了金融业的高级管理人员是否、为什么以及在什么条件下向监管机构求职。了解这个就业市场的机制是非常重要的，以促进从国家监管制度向稳定的欧洲银行联盟的有效和高效的过渡，并避免金融不稳定，如果目标冲突和由此产生的寻租未被发现。金融业监管机构的任命被称为旋转门现象。反过来，我们的重点是迁移到监管机构的高管。金融业的经验可以促进技术问题人力资本的体制积累，从而提高监督和管理的质量。然而，以前的行业咒语可能会导致偏离社会最佳结果的激励。与金融业前雇主的关系可能使政策制定者更容易任人唯亲和监管俘虏。我们确定这些对立的力量及其原因的相对重要性，并提出两个具体的问题，关于反向旋转门：是否提供就业机会，在监管部门影响银行家的职业选择？监管机构过去在受监管实体中的经验如何影响规则的实施和/或设计（例如，复杂性（？欧洲国家和超国家当局的互动提供了一个完美的试验场。鉴于高度内源性的现象在手，我们使用的差异中的差异的方法，我们暴露于一个菜单的替代识别策略的外源性冲击来解释银行家的就业能力作为监管机构。作为对就业能力的负面外生冲击，我们利用他们的银行被列入受单一监管机制（SSM）监管的机构名单。其次，我们使用银行SSM状态的交错变化作为系统相关银行随时间变化的集合。第三，我们利用2014年1月1日生效的资本要求指令（CRD IV）下的奖金上限的引入，以确定合规和违规银行高管之间的潜在差异就业能力的影响。第四，为了评估旋转门现象对监督和规则制定活动的重要性，我们将利用欧洲各国交错引入的所谓冷却期，这限制了公务员进入私营部门。引入冷却期会从外部增加银行业和监管部门之间的劳动力流动摩擦，可以采用差异中的差异方法。总而言之，所提出的分析可以揭示银行家和他们的监管者之间挥之不去的关系的福利影响。

We investigate if, why, and under which conditions senior executives from the financial industry seek employment with supervisory authorities. Understanding the mechanics of this job market is of eminent importance to facilitate the efficient and effective transition from national supervisory regimes towards a stable European Banking Union and avoid financial instability if goal conflicts and resulting rent seeking goes undetected. The appointment of supervisors in the financial industry is known as the revolving doors phenomenon. Our focus, in turn, is on executives that migrate to the regulator. Experience in the financial industry may facilitate the institutional accumulation of human capital on technical matters, thereby improving the quality of supervision and regulation. Yet, previous industry spells may entail incentives to deviate from socially optimal outcomes. Bonds with former employers in the financial industry may render policy makers more prone to cronyism and regulatory capture. We identify the relative importance of these opposing forces and its causes and ask two specific questions concerning reverse revolving doors: Does the availability of employment opportunities in the regulatory sector affect bankers' career choices? How do regulators' past experiences in regulated entities affect the implementation and/or the design of rules (e.g., in terms of complexity)?The interaction of national and supranational authorities in Europe provides a perfect testing ground. Given the highly endogenous nature of the phenomena at hand, we use a difference-in-difference methodology that we expose to a menu of alternative identification strategies in terms of exogenous shocks to explain banker’s employability as regulators. As a negative exogenous shock to employability, we exploit their bank’s inclusion into the list of institutions subject to supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Second, we use staggered changes of bank SSM status as the set of systemically relevant banks changed over time. Third, we exploit the introduction of bonus caps under Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) that came into force on January 1, 2014 to identify potential differential employability effects between compliant and non-compliant bank executives. Fourth, to evaluate the importance of the revolving doors phenomenon on supervisory and rule-making activity, we will exploit the staggered introduction of so-called cooling-off periods across European countries, which restrict civil servants moves to the private sector. The introduction of cooling-off periods exogenously increases frictions in worker flows between the banking and the regulatory sector, and can be used in a difference-in-differences approach. All in all, the proposed analysis can shed light on the welfare implications of lingering relationships between bankers and their supervisors.