The Root of the Epistemological Problem of the Connection of the Rational Principle to the External World in the Rationalists of the Early Modern Period - Descartes, Leibniz and Du Châtelet

在我的研究项目中，我希望调查在基于理性原则的知识基础上出现的一个问题的根源。这个问题在康德身上显露出来，即如何将感性的内容与建立知识的内在原理一起思考的问题。然而，问题的真正根源在于近代早期的理性主义者，即笛卡尔和莱布尼茨。如果毫无疑问的知识要建立在一个普遍的内在原则上，与感性分开，那么就必然会出现一个问题(理性主义者自己提出的)，即感性的内容如何进入知识的原则。换句话说：知识是如何建立在理性原则上的，作为对外部世界或依赖于该世界的对象的知识。这个问题是不稳定的，因为它同时对理性主义的出发点提出了质疑，即把知识建立在一个普遍的内在原则上。我的研究项目是通过介绍一位哲学家艾米丽·杜·查泰莱来揭示这个问题，他在这种情况下一直被忽视。与笛卡尔和莱布尼茨一样，她也把知识建立在理性原则上，但她同时强调经验知识对科学和哲学的价值。她的时间概念超越了她自己的理性原则，建立在对其想法的反映上，这考虑到了我们通过情感对外部世界的认识。因此，杜夏特莱的时间概念通过抓住现代早期理性主义者的理性原则与外部世界之间的联系问题的根源，为这一项目提供了出发点。我提议的研究在今天特别有意义，因为这个问题从来没有完全解决过，我声称已经在Du Chátelet找到了一个关键，可以在不陷入经验前提的情况下启动问题的解决方案。

In my research project I wish to investigate the root of a problem that arose in the foundation of knowledge based on a rational principle. The problem comes to light in Kant, i.e. in the question of how the content of sensibility is to be thought together with an internal principle which founds knowledge. Yet the actual root of the problem lies in the rationalists of the Early Modern Era, namely in Descartes and Leibniz. If indubitable knowledge is to be founded on a universal inner principle, in separation from sensibility, the question necessarily then arises (which the rationalists themselves pose) as to how the content of sensibility is to enter into the principle of knowledge. In other words: how is knowledge founded on a rational principle to serve as knowledge of an exterior world or of an object dependent on that world. The problem is precarious, insofar as it simultaneously puts the rationalistic point of departure into question; namely of founding knowledge on a general inner principle. My research project is to cast new light on the problem by introducing a philosopher, Émilie du Châtelet, who has until now been neglected in precisely this context. As with Descartes and Leibniz, she also founds knowledge on a rational principle, yet she simultaneously emphasises the value of experiential knowledge for science and philosophy. With her concept of time she goes beyond her own rational principle and founds it on a reflection of its idea, which takes into account our knowledge of the exterior world through sensibility. Du Châtelet’s concept of time therefore provides the point of departure for this project, by tugging at the root of the problem of the connection between the rational principle and the exterior world in the rationalists of the Early Modern Era. My proposed research is of particular interest today since the problem was never fully solved, and I purport to have found in Du Châtelet a key to initiating a solution to the problem without falling back on an empirical premise.