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Hierarchical and Hybrid Money on a Fractured Continent: Europe’s Monetary Architecture after the Eurocrisis

破碎大陆上的等级制和混合货币：欧洲危机后欧洲的货币架构

基本信息

批准号：
415922179
负责人：
Dr. Steffen Murau
金额：
--
依托单位：
Global Climate Forum e.V. (GCF)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Fellowships
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2017-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/415922179?language=en
关键词：
Hierarchical Hybrid Money Fractured Continent

项目摘要

In my research, I work on the development of a political-economic theory of institutional change in monetary systems using the conceptual tools of the Money View—an emerging functionalist literature on modern credit money systems. This project will continue my work of applying the Money View to the transformation of the European Monetary Union’s (EMU) architecture. This will bring out the unique hierarchical and hybrid structure of public and private, national and supranational money creation of the existing monetary architecture. Using a case study-based institutionalist research design in collaboration with a group of international researchers, the project traces the transformation of the Euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the wider Eurozone financial system through the 2007-9 Global Financial Crisis and the 2009-12 Eurocrisis onto today’s monetary reality.In the original design of the EMU architecture, the ECB was issuing supranational high-powered money while money creation in the private banking and shadow banking systems remained predominantly national. In 2009, after a decade of smooth sailing, the Eurocrisis brought the EMU at the brink of collapse. The endogenous crisis dynamics and the ensuing political reforms led to profound changes of the way in which money creation takes place within the multilayered currency bloc: Private credit money creation by banks and shadow banks via deposits and repos was sharply reduced, but automatically compensated by new forms of public credit money creation in the form of TARGET2 balances. At the same time, various political reforms were implemented within the boundaries of the EU decision-making mechanisms between member states and EU institutions. The ECB—initially conceived of as a rule-based and politically constrained institution—came out of the crisis as the dominant player in the EMU’s equilibrium of forces, with high discretionary powers that it used to embark on new forms of public money creation via Quantitative Easing (QE).In consequence, today’s EMU’s architecture differs profoundly from the one that had been initially planned. Yet, it does not remotely correspond to the expected European "super state" with a full-fledged EU government, treasury and public debt that many of the original policy-makers had expected as the result of a quasi-teleological development. After the institutional transformation driven by crisis and political intervention, the EMU is an idiosyncratic beast in which public and private credit money creation is organized across various national and international layers in a historically unprecedented way that has not yet been systematically captured. This project sets out to fill this gap. It will analyze how the mechanisms of private and public money creation have changed during and after the Eurocrisis and have thus transformed the EMU architecture in general. Subsequently, it will develop a political-economic explanation to theorize on this process.

在我的研究中，我使用货币观的概念工具，对货币制度的制度变迁的政治经济理论的发展工作-现代信用货币系统的新兴功能主义文献。这个项目将继续我的工作，应用货币观点的欧洲货币联盟（EMU）的架构的转变。这将带来现有货币架构中公共和私人、国家和超国家货币创造的独特层次和混合结构。该项目采用基于案例研究的制度主义研究设计，与一组国际研究人员合作，通过2007-9年全球金融危机和2009-12年欧洲危机，追踪欧元、欧洲中央银行（ECB）和更广泛的欧元区金融体系到今天货币现实的转变。在EMU架构的原始设计中，欧洲央行发行超国家的强力货币，而私人银行和影子银行系统的货币创造仍然主要是国家的。2009年，在经历了十年的一帆风顺之后，欧洲危机将欧洲货币联盟带到了崩溃的边缘。内生的危机动态和随之而来的政治改革导致了货币创造在多层次货币集团内发生的方式的深刻变化：银行和影子银行通过存款和回购的私人信贷货币创造急剧减少，但以TARGET 2余额形式的新形式的公共信贷货币创造自动补偿。与此同时，在成员国和欧盟机构之间的欧盟决策机制范围内实施了各种政治改革。欧洲央行--最初被认为是一个基于规则和政治约束的机构--在危机中成为了欧洲货币联盟力量均衡的主导者，拥有很高的自由裁量权，可以通过量化宽松（QE）开始新形式的公共货币创造。结果，今天的欧洲货币联盟架构与最初计划的架构有着深刻的不同。然而，它与许多最初的政策制定者所期望的欧洲“超级国家”（拥有一个成熟的欧盟政府、财政和公共债务）相距甚远，这些都是准目的论发展的结果。在危机和政治干预推动的制度转型之后，欧洲货币联盟是一个特殊的野兽，其中公共和私人信贷货币创造以前所未有的方式在各个国家和国际层面上组织起来，这种方式尚未被系统地捕获。本项目旨在填补这一空白。它将分析私人和公共货币创造机制如何在欧洲危机期间和之后发生变化，从而改变了欧洲货币联盟的总体架构。随后，它将发展一个政治经济解释理论化这一过程。