Early Phenomenology--Brentanno school and Husserl

1.在解释了布伦塔诺的意向性和意识概念的意义和问题之后，我澄清了胡塞尔的意向性和意识概念与布伦塔诺的概念相比的独创性。本文从格式塔心理学的基本理论出发，从埃塞尔费尔斯到胡塞尔，再到格拉兹学派和柏林学派，对格式塔概念的基本问题进行了研究。它已经澄清，有两个时刻纠缠在概念的完形，ei。“意义”时刻和“组织”时刻，这是通过胡塞尔和梅洛=庞蒂整合到知觉的现象学理论。在对早期现象学和格式塔理论研究的基础上，我试图从现象学的角度建立“心灵哲学”。特别是对脑科学和心灵哲学中的核心问题--意识问题，从现象学的角度进行了探讨，提出了意识和身体的现象学“双面说”。

1. Having interpreted the significance and the problem of Brentano's concepts of intentionality and consciousness, which are considered to be key concepts in the history of phenomenology, I have clarified where the originality of Husserlian concepts of intentionality and consciousness lie in contrast with Brentanian concepts.2. I have investigated basic problems concerning the concept of Gestalt in the stream of Gestalt psychology, from Ehrenfels through Husserl to Graz school and Berlin school. It has been clarified that there are two moments entangled in the concept of Gestalt, ei. the 'meaning' moment and the 'organization' moment, which are integrated through Husserl and Merlau=Ponty into the phenomenological theory of perception.3. On the ground of the studies about early phenomenology and Gestalt theory, I have tried to establish 'philosophy of mind' from the phenomenological point of view. Especially problems concerning consciousness, which is now considered to be the central problem in the brain science and philosophy of mind, are investigated from the phenomenological point of view, and a phenomenological 'double aspect theory' of consciousness and body is proposed.