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The Consciousness-the science and phenomenology about it

意识——有关它的科学和现象学

基本信息

批准号：
10610006
负责人：
MURATA Junichi
金额：
$ 1.34万
依托单位：
The University of Tokyo
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1998
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1998 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Recently it is often said that the consciousness becomes a research subject of natural sciences, and it is no more considered a peculiar subject exclusively belonging to philosophy. Indeed we find various hypotheses about consciousness in the fields of brainscience, cognitive science or ethology. In this situation, the purpose of this research is firstly to make clear what kind of fundamental difficulties there are in the studies of of sciences about consciousness and secondly to make clear the possibility of "ecological phenomenology" which makes a productive use of the phenomenological insights concerning consciousness.When it comes to the science of consciousness, there are two extreme positions. One is the materialistic and scientistic position, according to which conscious phenomena are to be reduced or eliminated because of the development of brain science. The other is the subjective and "agnostic" position, according to which the important character of consciousness can never be explained. The phenomenology is sometimes considered to belong to the latter position. In contrast to this kind of view, seeing the characteristic of consciousness in the interactional process between subject and environment and the bodily "Being in the World", I have tried to liberate the concept of consciousness from the subjectivistic tendency. At the same time I have tried to find an alternative view against the materialistic one in which consciousness is related only to the brain process. In order to make this "ecological phenomenology" more concrete, I have taken up various studies about color phenomena as a typical example in which scientific and phenomenological view are interwoven. Especially interesting is the controversy between Goehte and Newton, or Helmholtz and Hering, from which we could learn much.

最近人们常说，意识已成为自然科学的一个研究课题，而不再被认为是一个专属于哲学的特殊学科。事实上，我们在脑科学、认知科学或行为学领域发现了关于意识的各种假设。在这种情况下，本研究的目的首先是为了弄清楚意识科学的研究存在什么样的根本困难，其次是为了明确“生态现象学”的可能性，它有效地利用了关于意识的现象学见解。当谈到意识科学时，存在两种极端的立场。一种是唯物主义和科学主义的立场，根据这种立场，由于脑科学的发展，意识现象将被减少或消除。另一种是主观的和“不可知论”的立场，根据这种立场，意识的重要特征永远无法被解释。现象学有时被认为属于后一种立场。与这种观点相反，看到主体与环境以及身体“存在于世界”相互作用过程中的意识特征，我试图将意识概念从主观主义倾向中解放出来。同时，我试图找到一种反对唯物主义观点的替代观点，在这种观点中，意识仅与大脑过程相关。为了使这种“生态现象学”更加具体，我以各种关于颜色现象的研究作为科学观点与现象学观点交织在一起的典型例子。特别有趣的是歌特和牛顿、亥姆霍兹和赫林之间的争论，我们可以从中学到很多东西。