The Structure of Fundamentality

基础性的结构

• 批准号: 448954791
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Benjamin Schnieder
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Philosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/448954791?language=en
• 关键词: Structure; Fundamentality

It is a perennial question whether, in order to obtain, every fact needs a fundament on which it rests, or whether there are also fundamental facts, which lay the basis for other facts while not resting on any fundament themselves. Accordingly, the notion of fundamentality has played a central role in metaphysics from ancient times onwards and still plays a pivotal role in the contemporary debate (it also figures prominently in philosophical areas other than metaphysics).This research project examines approaches to the idea of fundamentality that employ a notion which has garnered significant attention in recent debates in metaphysics: the notion of metaphysical grounding, understood as a productive priority relation in virtue of which some facts obtain because of others, i.e. their grounds. Within a ground-theoretical approach, the notion of fundamentality can be given a straightforward definition: A fact is fundamental if and only if it is not grounded in any further facts. But apart from this basic definition, the framework allows for more sophisticated variants of it. The research project has three aims:(i) To deepen our understanding of the ground-theoretical approach to fundamentality, and compare the approach with rival ones.(ii) To defend the ground-theoretical approach to fundamentality against objections raised in recent literature.(iii) Most importantly, to develop more sophisticated ways of defining fundamentality in terms of grounding, thus allowing for insightful distinctions and applications to which the simple definition is blind. As to this third, central aim of the project, we will in particular explore two themes:(A) The idea that some facts may be partially fundamental while not being fully fundamental (which is important, for instance, for the debate about emergence). In order to make room for this idea, we develop a novel account of the notion of a partial ground, on which some facts are partially grounded in other facts while lacking a full ground. Such facts can then be regarded as partially fundamental. We will develop this idea in a rigorous formal framework and demonstrate its fruitfulness for existing debates.(B) Kit Fine’s idea that there can be two sorts of facts that are not grounded in other facts: on the one hand, facts which are simply ungrounded (e.g. brute facts about the distribution of matter in space); on the other, facts which intuitively can count as grounded, though not grounded in any further facts (e.g. certain logical laws). This distinction gives rise to a corresponding one between two sorts of fundamentality which has hitherto gone unnoticed.

一个长期存在的问题是，为了获得每一个事实，是否都需要一个它所依赖的基础，或者是否也存在一些基本事实，这些基本事实为其他事实奠定了基础，而它们本身并不依赖于任何基础。因此，基本性的概念从古代起就在形而上学中扮演着核心角色，并且在当代的争论中仍然扮演着关键角色（它也在哲学领域以外的形而上学的突出数字）.这个研究项目探讨的方法，以基本的想法，采用了一个概念，这已经获得了在最近的辩论形而上学的显著关注：形而上学根据的概念，被理解为一种生产性的优先关系，凭借这种关系，一些事实因其他事实而获得，即它们的根据。在基础理论的方法中，基本性的概念可以给出一个简单的定义：一个事实是基本的，当且仅当它不以任何进一步的事实为基础。但除了这个基本定义之外，这个框架还允许更复杂的变体。研究项目有三个目的：（i）加深我们对基础性的基础理论方法的理解，并将该方法与竞争对手的方法进行比较。(ii)针对最近文献中提出的反对意见，为基本性的基础理论方法辩护。(iii)最重要的是，发展更复杂的方式来定义基础，从而允许有见地的区别和应用，而简单的定义是盲目的。至于第三个，也就是本项目的核心目标，我们将特别探讨两个主题：（A）某些事实可能部分是基本的，但并不完全是基本的（这一点很重要，例如，对于关于涌现的辩论）。为了给这一观点留出空间，我们提出了一个关于部分根据概念的新颖解释，即某些事实部分地基于其他事实，而缺乏充分的根据。这样的事实可以被视为部分基本的。我们将在一个严格的正式框架中发展这一想法，并证明其对现有辩论的成果。(B)基特·法恩的观点认为，可以有两种不基于其他事实的事实：一方面，根本不基于其他事实的事实（例如，关于物质在空间中分布的残酷事实）;另一方面，直觉上可以算作基于其他事实的事实（例如，某些逻辑定律）。这种区别引起了两种基本性之间的相应区别，而这两种基本性到目前为止还没有引起人们的注意。