Fichte and Human Rights

云杉与人权

• 批准号: 451551446
• 负责人: Dr. Esther Lea Neuhann
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Philosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: WBP Position
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2020-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/451551446?language=en
• 关键词: Fichte; Human; Rights

In the project, I reconstruct Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s (1762-1814) conception of human rights and show that it provides fruitful insights for the current state of the philosophy of human rights. Fichte’s most important works regarding the topic of human rights are "Contribution to the Rectification of the Public’s Judgment on the French Revolution" (1793) and "Foundations of Natural Right, according to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre" (1796/7). Fichte’s view changed considerably over the course of a few years: While he attempted to ground human rights in morality in 1793, he aimed at their non-moral justification in 1796. The focus of the project is on the later position. The chapter on the “deduction of original right” is decisive for the reconstruction of Fichte’s position in the "Foundations of Natural Right". Regarding the contemporary relevance of Fichte’s approach, four systematically attractive and innovative features of Fichte’s conception of human rights are worth highlighting: a) Fichte’s approach is relational: human rights are meant to protect a particular form of social relation between persons (“free reciprocal efficacy” [freie Wechselwirkung]). Fichte is therefore immune to the criticism that human rights are based on an atomistic conception of the person or of freedom. b) For Fichte, an important aspect of human rights is that they ought to protect a person’s body [Leib]. Crucially, he does not conceive of the human body in merely biological terms. As a consequence, Fichte is able to stress the importance of the inviolability of the human body for the idea of human rights without being vulnerable to the criticism that human rights merely protect “bare life” (Agamben). c) Human rights have a specific normativity for Fichte: Their normativity is not of the moral kind, but genuinely belongs to the realm of ‘right’ (Recht). Nevertheless, Fichte does not succumb to positivism. d) For Fichte, human rights play two interrelated roles: they describe the minimal features of any rightful state (the basic right-role) and provide normative orientation for the relation between states (external role).

在这个项目中，我重构了约翰·戈特利布·费希特（Johann Gottlieb Fichte，1762-1814）的人权概念，并表明它为人权哲学的现状提供了富有成效的见解。 费希特关于人权主题的最重要的著作是《纠正公众对法国大革命判断的贡献》（1793）和《根据科学原理的自然权利基础》（1796/7）。费希特的观点在几年的时间里发生了很大的变化：虽然他在 1793 年试图将人权植根于道德，但他在 1796 年的目标是人权的非道德正当性。该项目的重点是后来的立场。 “原始权利的演绎”一章对于重构费希特在《自然权利基础》中的地位具有决定性意义。就费希特方法的当代意义而言，费希特人权概念有四个具有系统吸引力和创新性的特征值得强调：a）费希特的方法是关系性的：人权旨在保护人与人之间特定形式的社会关系（“自由互惠功效”[freie Wechselwirkung]）。因此，费希特不会受到关于人权是基于个人或自由的原子论概念的批评。 b) 对于费希特来说，人权的一个重要方面是应该保护人的身体[Leib]。至关重要的是，他并不仅仅从生物学角度来理解人体。因此，费希特能够强调人体不可侵犯对于人权观念的重要性，而不会受到人权仅仅保护“赤裸生命”的批评（阿甘本）。 c）费希特认为人权具有特定的规范性：其规范性不是道德规范，而是真正属于“权利”（Recht）领域。尽管如此，费希特并没有屈服于实证主义。 d) 对于费希特来说，人权扮演着两个相互关联的角色：它们描述了任何合法国家的最低特征（基本权利角色），并为国家之间的关系提供了规范导向（外部角色）。