Fichte and Human Rights

在这个项目中，我重建了约翰·戈特利布·费希特(Johann Gottlieb Fichte)(1762-1814)的人权观，并表明它为人权哲学的现状提供了富有成效的见解。关于人权问题，费希特最重要的著作是《对纠正公众对法国大革命的判断的贡献》(1793)和《根据智慧的原则建立自然权利》(1796/7)。费希特的观点在几年的时间里发生了很大的变化：当他在1793年试图将人权建立在道德的基础上时，他在1796年瞄准了人权的非道德理由。该项目的重点是后一种立场。“原始权利的演绎”一章对费希特在“自然权利基础”中的地位的重建具有决定性意义。关于费希特的方法在当代的现实意义，值得强调的是，费希特的人权观有四个具有系统吸引力和创新性的特点：a)费希特的方法是关系的：人权旨在保护人与人之间的一种特定形式的社会关系(“自由互惠效力”[Freie Wechselwirkung])。因此，费希特不会受到批评，即人权是建立在人或自由的原子论概念之上的。B)对Fichte来说，人权的一个重要方面是它们应该保护一个人的身体[Leib]。最重要的是，他并不仅仅从生物学的角度来构想人体。因此，费希特能够强调人体不可侵犯对于人权理念的重要性，而不容易受到批评，即人权只是保护“赤裸裸的生命”(阿甘本)。C)对费希特来说，人权具有特定的规范性：它们的规范性不是道德上的，而是真正属于“权利”的领域。然而，费希特并没有屈服于实证主义。D)对费希特来说，人权扮演着两个相互关联的角色：它们描述了任何合法国家的最低限度的特征(基本权利--角色)，并为国家之间的关系(外部角色)提供了规范的方向。

In the project, I reconstruct Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s (1762-1814) conception of human rights and show that it provides fruitful insights for the current state of the philosophy of human rights. Fichte’s most important works regarding the topic of human rights are "Contribution to the Rectification of the Public’s Judgment on the French Revolution" (1793) and "Foundations of Natural Right, according to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre" (1796/7). Fichte’s view changed considerably over the course of a few years: While he attempted to ground human rights in morality in 1793, he aimed at their non-moral justification in 1796. The focus of the project is on the later position. The chapter on the “deduction of original right” is decisive for the reconstruction of Fichte’s position in the "Foundations of Natural Right". Regarding the contemporary relevance of Fichte’s approach, four systematically attractive and innovative features of Fichte’s conception of human rights are worth highlighting: a) Fichte’s approach is relational: human rights are meant to protect a particular form of social relation between persons (“free reciprocal efficacy” [freie Wechselwirkung]). Fichte is therefore immune to the criticism that human rights are based on an atomistic conception of the person or of freedom. b) For Fichte, an important aspect of human rights is that they ought to protect a person’s body [Leib]. Crucially, he does not conceive of the human body in merely biological terms. As a consequence, Fichte is able to stress the importance of the inviolability of the human body for the idea of human rights without being vulnerable to the criticism that human rights merely protect “bare life” (Agamben). c) Human rights have a specific normativity for Fichte: Their normativity is not of the moral kind, but genuinely belongs to the realm of ‘right’ (Recht). Nevertheless, Fichte does not succumb to positivism. d) For Fichte, human rights play two interrelated roles: they describe the minimal features of any rightful state (the basic right-role) and provide normative orientation for the relation between states (external role).