Reconstruction of the categories of litigation/non-adversarial case

1960年，最高法院大法官就宪法对执行与“审判权”有关的“公开对抗性裁决”的程序保障作出了一项裁决。出于以下原因，最高法院的这一决定应该改变。在最高法院的早期案件中，非对抗性案件被“从正常的诉讼程序中扣留”，然而，目前，“审判权”是根据“它是否纯粹是对抗性的(或诉讼的)”来决定的。关于这一推理一直存在批评。最近，家事法院诉讼领域的专家认为，最高法院对《家事法院法》中被归类为“大津型”的非对抗性案件的推理失败，因为“无论在理论上还是在现实中，民事诉讼在解决纠纷中的作用都是确立实体法下的权利和义务。”此外，就诉讼/非对抗性案件的类别和裁决/Tempo…而言对于更常见的程序，可以分为以下几类：(A)诉讼等同于裁决程序；(B)诉讼等同于临时程序；以及(C)非对抗性案件等同于临时程序。1960年的大法官裁决只包括(A)和(C)两类，似乎没有考虑到(B)项。然而，(B)类包括在民事诉讼和行政诉讼中都发挥重要作用的“临时命令”。由于案例理论只要求在特殊情况下进行口头辩论或单方面听证，因此(B)类案件一般从未从宪法的角度进行审查。因此，可能需要从宪法的角度考虑(B)和(C)两类。换言之，如果宪法第三十二条中的“审判”概念被解释为比第八十二条的概念更宽泛，那么第三十二条可以被解释为包括其他不包括在“公开对抗性裁决”中的手续。较少

In 1960, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court made a judgment concerning constitutional procedural guarantees for conducting "public adversarial rulings" relating it to the "right to trial." This Supreme Court decision should be changed for the following reasons. In the early cases of the Supreme Court, non-adversarial cases were "withheld from normal litigation procedure," however, at present, a "right to trial" is decided on the grounds of whether or not "it is purely adversarial (or litigious)." There has been criticism concerning this reasoning. Recently, experts in the field of family court proceedings argue that the Supreme Court's reasoning fails in regard to non-adversarial cases categorized as "Otsu-type" within the Family Court Law since, "civil litigation, neither theoretically nor in reality, functions in dispute resolution to establish rights and obligations under substantive law."Furthermore, in terms of the categories of litigation/non-adversarial cases and rulings/tempo … More rary procedures, divisions can be made in the following categories : (a)litigation equals rulings procedure ; (b)litigation equals temporary procedures ; and (c)non-adversarial cases equal temporary procedures. The Grand Bench decision in 1960 only included the categories of (a) and (c) and did not seem to have (b) in mind. However, the category of (b) includes "temporary orders" which play a significant role in both civil litigation as well as administrative litigation. Since case theory orders oral arguments or ex parte hearings only in exceptional cases, the (b) category in general has never been examined from a constitutional perspective. Therefore, there may be a need to consider a constitutional perspective for the categories of (b) and (c). In other words, if the concept of "trial" in Article 32 of the Constitution is interpreted to be wider than that of Article 82, then Article 32 can be interpreted to include other formalities that are not included in "public adversarial rulings." Less