A theoretical study on compansation systems, endogenous timing of wage setting and their effects on economic welfare

补偿制度、工资设定的内生时机及其对经济福利影响的理论研究

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    16530122
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 1.79万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    日本
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
  • 财政年份:
    2004
  • 资助国家:
    日本
  • 起止时间:
    2004 至 2006
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

This project firstly analyzes the endogenous order of wage bargaining in a right-to-manage duopoly model with a profit-sharing and a conventional non-profit-sharing firm. The firms announce the periods in which they will engage in wage bargaining with their unions in advance and are then committed to their choices. Once the wage rates are determined by the bargaining, the firms choose the output levels of homogenous products that are sold in the duopoly market. Only the Stackelberg equilibrium, with the profit-sharing firm engaging in wage bargaining first and the conventional r on-profit-sharing firm delaying it, emerges endogenously. This result is consistent with the sequential wage bargaining observed in the spring offensive [Shunto] process in Japan.This project secondly analyzes the effects of sequential wage bargaining on the employment and wages using a unionized duopoly model with a profit-sharing and a conventional non-profit-sharing firm. As a result, it is shown that the sequential wage bargaining makes the employment of the profit-sharing firm stable but that of the conventional firm volatile compared to the simultaneous move. Also, a positive shock to the profit-sharing firm decreases the conventional firm's employment more in the sequential move than in the simultaneous move. Taking into the fact into account that large profit-sharing firms are located in the urban regions while small and medium conventional firms are in the rural regions, our results are consistent with the recent Japanese labour market experiences.
本文首先分析了利润分享和非利润分享的双寡头模型中工资谈判的内生秩序。这些公司事先宣布他们将与工会进行工资谈判的时间,然后承诺他们的选择。一旦工资率由讨价还价决定,企业就选择在双寡头市场上销售的同质产品的产量水平。只有Stackelberg均衡,即利润分享企业首先进行工资谈判,而传统的利润分享企业推迟工资谈判,才是内生的。这一结果与日本春季攻势[Shunto]过程中观察到的连续工资谈判是一致的。本课题的第二部分,使用利润分享的工会化双寡头模型和传统的非利润分享企业,分析连续工资谈判对就业和工资的影响。结果表明,顺序工资谈判使利润分享企业的就业稳定,但传统企业的波动相比,同时移动。此外,一个积极的冲击,利润分享公司减少传统公司的就业更多的顺序移动比在同时移动。考虑到大型利润分享企业位于城市地区,而中小型传统企业位于农村地区,我们的结果与日本最近的劳动力市场经验一致。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(14)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
相互市場モデルにおける最適輸出補助金政策
共同市场模型下的最优出口补贴政策
賃金交渉と内生的シュタッケルベルク均衡
工资谈判和内生斯塔克尔伯格均衡
Optimal Export Subsidy Policy in a Reciprocal Market Model
互惠市场模型下的最优出口补贴政策
Sequential Wage Bargaining and its Impacts on Local Labour Markets
连续工资谈判及其对当地劳动力市场的影响
Wage Bargainig and the Endogenous Schtackelberg Equilibria
工资谈判和内生施塔克尔伯格均衡
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TAKAMI Hiroyuki其他文献

TAKAMI Hiroyuki的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('TAKAMI Hiroyuki', 18)}}的其他基金

Theoretical research of endogenous timing and economic welfare
内生时机与经济福利的理论研究
  • 批准号:
    20530245
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 资助金额:
    $ 1.79万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

相似海外基金

International outsourcing, job loss fears and wage bargaining
国际外包、失业担忧和工资谈判
  • 批准号:
    73479361
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 资助金额:
    $ 1.79万
  • 项目类别:
    Research Grants
Strikes and Delays in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
工资谈判中的罢工和延误:理论和数据
  • 批准号:
    8921625
  • 财政年份:
    1990
  • 资助金额:
    $ 1.79万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
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