Information Frictions, Central Bank Communication, and Monetary Policy

信息摩擦、央行沟通与货币政策

• 批准号: 495072044
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Donghai Zhang, Ph.D.
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Makroökonomik und Ökonometrie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/495072044?language=en
• 关键词: Information; Frictions; Central; Bank; Communication

Economic conditions, such as the natural level of output and the natural unemployment rate, are not observable. Central banks, e.g., the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve bank (Fed) in the United States, attribute abundant resources to monitor economic activities. Thus, they might have superior information regarding the state of the economy. In this project, we address the following questions. Should the central bank reveal its private information about economic conditions? How does asymmetric information between the central bank and private market affect the transmission of monetary policy? How do information frictions affect the design of optimal monetary policy? Answers to these questions are relevant within the academic circle and important for policymakers. The proposed research project consists of three papers that aim to answer these questions separately. The conventional wisdom views the increased central bank transparency as optimal. In the first paper, we propose to study the optimal central bank communication based on a framework with dispersed beliefs and nominal rigidity. We argue that more transparency does not necessarily improve welfare due to nominal rigidities. Our model allows quantifying the welfare loss/gain of central bank communication. Once the project is completed, we will provide a policy recommendation whether the Fed, the Bank of England, or the ECB have released too much information to the market. In the second paper, we study the effects of monetary policy in a model with asymmetric information between the central bank and the private market. Moreover, we introduce ambiguous signals and ambiguity-averse agents. The ambiguous signaling channel of monetary policy emerges in such a framework. In the third paper, we study the optimal monetary policy in a model with dispersed beliefs, nominal rigidity, and endogenous learning from price.

经济条件，如自然产出水平和自然失业率，是不可观察的。中央银行，例如，欧洲中央银行（ECB）和美国的联邦储备银行（Fed）都有充足的资源来监控经济活动。因此，他们可能拥有有关经济状况的上级信息。在这个项目中，我们解决以下问题。中央银行是否应该披露其关于经济状况的私人信息？中央银行与民间市场之间的信息不对称如何影响货币政策传导？信息摩擦如何影响最优货币政策的设计？这些问题的答案与学术界有关，对决策者也很重要。 该研究项目由三篇论文组成，旨在分别回答这些问题。传统观点认为，提高央行透明度是最佳选择。在第一篇论文中，我们提出了一个框架，分散的信念和名义刚性的基础上研究最优中央银行的沟通。我们认为，由于名义刚性，更多的透明度并不一定会改善福利。我们的模型可以量化中央银行沟通的福利损失/收益。一旦项目完成，我们将提供一个政策建议，无论是美联储，英国央行，还是欧洲央行，都向市场释放了太多的信息。在第二篇论文中，我们研究了中央银行和私人市场之间存在信息不对称的货币政策效应。此外，我们还引入了模糊信号和模糊厌恶代理。在这样的框架下，货币政策信号传导渠道的模糊性就显现出来了。 在第三篇文章中，我们研究了一个具有分散信念、名义刚性和价格内生学习的模型中的最优货币政策。