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Realism and Antirealism in the Philosophy of Science Today

当今科学哲学中的实在论与反实在论

基本信息

批准号：
60301001
负责人：
IMAI Tomomasa
金额：
$ 3.46万
依托单位：
Chiba University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)
财政年份：
1985
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1985 至 1987
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Apart from each particular point of issue, our study in these three years has enabled us to give a total outline of the effects of our project as follows.We can take as a starting point of the dispute between realism and antirealism in this century V. Lenin's Materialism and Empirico-Criticism which defended materialism against idealism. However, when it gave the linguistic turn under the influence of G. Frege's and L. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, logical positivism reduced the framework of mind and matter to one of those problems which can simply be dealt with within the framework of language; it asserted the opposition between realism and idealism as nonsense because transcendental reality and transcendental ideas were both unattainable by our intelligible use of language. But logical positivism did not go so far as to break down the old framework itself. It was only when M. Dummett advanced a formulation of realism and antirealism as an affirmation and a denial of the principle of bivalence that it was broken down. And he further presented us with the opposition between classical logic and intuitionistic logic. Since then, he has raised doubts of whether classical logic grounded on the principle of bivalence should supply natural language with its basis, and has argued against realism that in so far as it demands the principle, it cannot escape illusion. This means that when the old framework has been replaced by the new one, realism has come to take the defensive. We can conclude that the fundamental problem concerning the opposition between realism and antirealism consists in the theory of reference and the theory of language understanding. There is no doubt that this will be a central theme of our next research project.

撇开具体的问题不谈，我们这三年来的研究，使我们能够把我们的计划的效果概括如下。我们可以把本世纪现实主义与反现实主义之争的起点，五、列宁的唯物主义和经验批判主义，捍卫唯物主义，反对唯心主义。然而，当逻辑实证主义在弗雷格和维特根斯坦语言哲学的影响下实现语言学转向时，它把心灵和物质的框架简化为可以简单地在语言框架内处理的问题之一；它声称现实主义和理想主义之间的对立是无稽之谈，因为先验的现实和先验的思想都是我们通过语言的可理解的使用而无法实现的。但逻辑实证主义并没有达到打破旧框架本身的程度。直到达米特先生提出了现实主义和反现实主义的表述作为对二价原则的肯定和否定时，它才被打破。他进一步向我们展示了经典逻辑与直觉逻辑的对立。从那时起，他对建立在二价原则基础上的古典逻辑是否应该为自然语言提供基础提出了质疑，并反对实在论，认为只要要求原则，它就无法逃脱幻觉。这意味着，当旧框架被新框架取代时，现实主义开始采取守势。可以说，现实主义与反现实主义对立的根本问题在于指称理论和语言理解理论。毫无疑问，这将是我们下一个研究项目的中心主题。