"A Dynamic Analysis of the Common Use of Network in Public Utility Industries"

该研究项目的目的是对电力、电信、天然气等公用事业行业中网络设施的普遍使用进行经济分析。以下两篇论文介绍了本研究项目所做的贡献：1。“垂直分离vs，垂直整合：进入威慑和成本降低激励与准入监管”本文考察了在放松管制的下游环境下的准入监管，并提出了垂直整合的现有企业是否应该拆分的问题。为了考虑这一问题，本文的模型以现有企业的进入威慑激励和网络设施上的工艺创新投资为特征。然后，分析首先表明，当准入收费低（高）时，整合条件下在职者的进入威慑激励通常比分离条件下更少（更多）。其次，垂直分离的主要优点是提供了较低的公共事业产品价格，而其缺点是其诱导在职者投资于网络设施的工艺创新能力较弱。此外，两种垂直制度之间的福利比较取决于公共资金影子成本的大小，这使得比较成为一个微妙的问题。“放松管制与资本投资”本文考察了公共事业公司在放松管制或引入竞争的情况下对资本投资的激励。本文利用实物期权方法证明，放松管制通过进入威胁给企业带来不确定性，使得企业的投资动机变弱。并对完善投资激励机制的政策救济进行了探讨。

The purpose of the research project is to provide an economic analysis of the common use of network facilities in public utility industries, like electricity, telecommunication, natural gas, etc. The contributions made by the research project are presented in the following two papers.1."Vertical Separation vs, Vertical Integration : Entry Deterrence and Cost- Reducing Incentives with Access Regulation"This paper examines access regulation under a deregurated downstream environment and asks whether a vertically integrated incumbent should be unbundled or not. To consider this issue, the model in the paper features an incumbent firm's entry-deterrence incentive and the investment for process innovation on a network facility. Then, the analysis firstly shows that the incumbent generally has less (more) entry-deterrence incentive under integration than under separation when an access charge is low (high). Secondly, the main merit of vertical separation is to provide a lower price of public-utility good, while its demerit is its weak power to induce an incumbent to invest for process innovation on network facility. Also, welfare comparison between the two vertical regimes depends on the magnitude of shadow cost of public funds, which makes the comparison a subtle issue.2."Deregulation and Capital Investment"This paper examines public-utility firms' incentives for capital investment with deregulation or the introduction of competition. In the paper, we claim by using real option approach that the deregulation makes the firms' incentives for investment weak, since it causes uncertainty to the firms through entry threat. Also, we discuss the policy remedies for the improvement of the investment incentives in the paper.