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"A Dynamic Analysis of the Common Use of Network in Public Utility Industries"

《公用事业行业网络共用动态分析》

基本信息

批准号：
11630068
负责人：
MIZUNO Keizo
金额：
$ 1.22万
依托单位：
Kwansei Gakuin University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1999
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1999 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of the research project is to provide an economic analysis of the common use of network facilities in public utility industries, like electricity, telecommunication, natural gas, etc. The contributions made by the research project are presented in the following two papers.1."Vertical Separation vs, Vertical Integration : Entry Deterrence and Cost- Reducing Incentives with Access Regulation"This paper examines access regulation under a deregurated downstream environment and asks whether a vertically integrated incumbent should be unbundled or not. To consider this issue, the model in the paper features an incumbent firm's entry-deterrence incentive and the investment for process innovation on a network facility. Then, the analysis firstly shows that the incumbent generally has less (more) entry-deterrence incentive under integration than under separation when an access charge is low (high). Secondly, the main merit of vertical separation is to provide a lower price of public-utility good, while its demerit is its weak power to induce an incumbent to invest for process innovation on network facility. Also, welfare comparison between the two vertical regimes depends on the magnitude of shadow cost of public funds, which makes the comparison a subtle issue.2."Deregulation and Capital Investment"This paper examines public-utility firms' incentives for capital investment with deregulation or the introduction of competition. In the paper, we claim by using real option approach that the deregulation makes the firms' incentives for investment weak, since it causes uncertainty to the firms through entry threat. Also, we discuss the policy remedies for the improvement of the investment incentives in the paper.

该研究项目的目的是对公用事业行业（如电力、电信、天然气等）中网络设施的普遍使用进行经济分析。“纵向分离与纵向一体化：进入管制的进入阻碍和降低成本的激励“本文考察了下游环境下的准入管制，并提出了纵向一体化的现有企业是否应该被分拆的问题。为了考虑这一问题，在本文的模型中，在位企业的进入威慑激励和网络设施的过程创新的投资。然后，分析首先表明，在进入费用低（高）的情况下，整合下的在位者通常比分离下的在位者具有更少（更多）的进入威慑激励。第二，纵向分离的主要优点是提供了一个较低的价格的公用事业产品，而它的缺点是它的力量弱，以诱导在位者投资于网络设施的工艺创新。此外，两种垂直制度之间的福利比较取决于公共资金的影子成本的大小，这使得比较成为一个微妙的问题。“放松管制与资本投资“本文探讨了公共事业企业在放松管制或引入竞争的情况下进行资本投资的动机。本文运用真实的期权方法分析了放松管制通过进入威胁给企业带来不确定性，从而削弱了企业的投资激励。最后，本文还对改善我国投资激励的政策措施进行了探讨。