ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

世界经济风险管理的经济分析

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    12303001
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    日本
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
  • 财政年份:
    2000
  • 资助国家:
    日本
  • 起止时间:
    2000 至 2002
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

This project has investigated risk management policies such as social security, trade conflicts, national security, and redistribution policy. We have considered the macroeconomic implications of public safety nets and the relationship between public and private adjustments against various risks. We have also developed theoretical frameworks for international public goods including defense spending, foreign aids, and abatements. Among others the followings are main results. (I) The neutrality theorem of public goods may be extended to the case where economic growth cannot affect the real equilibrium if we allow for abatement activities against pollutions due to growth. (ii) The international public good may become an inferior good if its role is to reduce probabilities of bad states. (iii) The steady-state level of national security may be too much in the competitive economy although it is too little compared with consumption. It is well known that capital accumulation may be too much in the long run when the competitive steady state economy is on the inefficient path. This is the income effect. If the income effect dominates the free-riding effect, the level of national security at the non-cooperative solution could be larger than the first best level. The larger the social discount rate and the smaller the penalty ratio, it is more likely to have such a paradoxical case. (iv) An increase in capital stock raises real income, stimulating the demand for national security. In order to have a larger amount of national security, the country is willing to pay more spending on national security. The national security-GDP ratio increases with capital accumulation. We have derived the exploitation hypothesis without depending on a public good nature of security spending among allies.
该项目研究了社会保障、贸易冲突、国家安全和再分配政策等风险管理政策。我们考虑了公共安全网的宏观经济影响,以及公共和私营部门针对各种风险进行的调整之间的关系。我们还开发了国际公共产品的理论框架,包括国防开支,对外援助,和援助。其中,以下是主要结果。(I)公共物品的中性定理可以推广到经济增长不能影响真实的均衡的情况,如果我们允许由于增长而产生的对污染的减排活动。(ii)如果国际公益的作用是减少坏国家出现的可能性,那么它就可能成为次善。(iii)在竞争经济中,国家安全的稳态水平可能太高,尽管与消费相比它太低。众所周知,当竞争性稳态经济处于非效率路径时,资本积累在长期内可能过多,这就是收入效应。如果收入效应超过搭便车效应,则非合作解决方案下的国家安全水平可能大于第一最佳水平。社会折现率越大,处罚比例越小,就越容易出现这样的悖论情况。(iv)资本存量的增加提高了真实的收入,刺激了对国家安全的需求。为了国家安全有更大的额度,国家愿意在国家安全上付出更多的支出。国家安全-GDP比率随着资本积累而增加。我们推导出了剥削假设,而不依赖于盟国之间安全支出的公共利益性质。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(101)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
井堀利宏: "A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction"European Journal of Political Economy. (発表予定).
Toshihiro Ibori:“财政重建的动态模型”欧洲政治经济学杂志(待出版)。
  • DOI:
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  • 影响因子:
    0
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  • 通讯作者:
井堀利宏: "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction (with Jun-ichi Itaya)"European Journal o Political Economy. 17,4. 779-797 (2001)
Toshihiro Ibori:“财政重建的动态模型(与 Jun-ichi Itaya)”《欧洲政治经济学杂志》17,4(2001)。
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
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  • 影响因子:
    0
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井堀利宏: "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan (with Takero Doi)"Journal of the Japanese and International Economics. 16,3. 492-511 (2002)
Toshihiro Ibori:“日本的财政重建和地方利益集团(与 Takero Doi)”《日本与国际经济学杂志》16,3 492-511(2002)。
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  • 发表时间:
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    0
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八田達夫: "都市再生と税制"フィナンシャル・レビュー. 第65号. 57-73 (2002)
Tatsuo Hatta:《城市再生与税收》财务评论第 65 期。57-73 (2002)。
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
  • 通讯作者:
Amihai Glazer: "Allies as rivals : Internal and external rent seeking"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 48,1. 155-162 (2002)
阿米海·格雷泽:“作为竞争对手的盟友:内部和外部寻租”《经济行为与组织杂志》。
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    0
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TABUCHI Takatoshi其他文献

STUDY ON MUNICIPAL SUBLEASE PROJECTS UTILIZING VACANT PRIVATE HOUSES
利用空置私人住宅进行市政转租项目研究

TABUCHI Takatoshi的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('TABUCHI Takatoshi', 18)}}的其他基金

Spatial economic analysis on urban agglomeration of economic activities in the world
世界城市群经济活动空间经济分析
  • 批准号:
    26285054
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
Frontier of Theory and Empirics in Spatial Economics
空间经济学理论与经验前沿
  • 批准号:
    25590054
  • 财政年份:
    2013
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
Spatial economics revisited and empirics on global city system
空间经济学的重新审视和全球城市体系的实证
  • 批准号:
    22330075
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
Economic system of cities in the world: Theory and empirics
世界城市经济体系:理论与经验
  • 批准号:
    18203012
  • 财政年份:
    2006
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
Economic Analysis of Centralization and Decentralization with Risk Management
集中与分散的经济分析与风险管理
  • 批准号:
    15203014
  • 财政年份:
    2003
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
Urban Economic Analysis on Tokyo Monopolar System
东京单极系统的城市经济分析
  • 批准号:
    08453004
  • 财政年份:
    1996
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
General theory and empirical anrlysis of location of firuis condncting intervational and interregrisnal division of labor
区域间分工的金融区位的一般理论与实证分析
  • 批准号:
    05630029
  • 财政年份:
    1993
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)

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Political Economic Analysis of Strategic Delegation and the Provision of International Public Good
战略授权与国际公共物品提供的政治经济学分析
  • 批准号:
    24530348
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
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The design of incentives for participating in an international public good mechanism
参与国际公益机制的激励设计
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    21730156
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    2009
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    $ 17.99万
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    Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Intellectual Property Rights as an International Public Good and the Frontiers of Patent Competition
知识产权作为国际公共物品与专利竞争的前沿
  • 批准号:
    13630053
  • 财政年份:
    2001
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.99万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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