权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Economic Analysis of Centralization and Decentralization with Risk Management

集中与分散的经济分析与风险管理

基本信息

批准号：
15203014
负责人：
TABUCHI Takatoshi
金额：
$ 24.54万
依托单位：
The University of Tokyo
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
财政年份：
2003
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2003 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

We have investigated the positive and normative aspects of risk management policy under centralized and decentralized system. We also considered risk management policy where risk occurs endogenously in a growth model setting. By incorporating macro fiscal and monetary policy, social security reform, and fiscal decentralization into the analytical framework, we have clarified the desirable properties of risk management. We investigated the current redistribution policy, the social security structure, and regional economic policy of major developed countries and derived interesting analytical results based on the actual policy issues of these countries. We have used the politico-economic approach to this topic.It is well recognized that although the disexternalities of pubic bads such as pollutants due to economic growth do not necessarily enhance welfare, the abatement behavior may offset such disexternalities. Moreover, if the agent evaluates growth much and conceives no need for conducting abatement, she gains from growth much. Thus, a natural conjecture is that growth normally enhances welfare especially for the poor agent. By explicitly incorporating the optimizing abatement behavior, we showed that the conjecture is not necessarily valid. Namely, a decrease in wealth differentials may not improve the quantity of environment, which could hurt even the poor, who faces a corner solution. We also showed that the worldwide economic growth would hurt the poor country if it deteriorates environment much, and the abatement technology is very inefficient, and the number of poor countries is large.

我们研究了集中和分散体制下风险管理政策的积极方面和规范方面。我们还考虑了风险管理政策，其中风险在增长模型设置中是内生的。通过将宏观财政和货币政策、社会保障改革和财政分权纳入分析框架，我们明确了风险管理的理想属性。我们调查了主要发达国家当前的再分配政策、社会保障结构和区域经济政策，并根据这些国家的实际政策问题得出了有趣的分析结果。我们使用了政治经济学的方法来研究这个话题。众所周知，虽然由于经济增长而产生的污染物等公共不良的非外部性不一定会提高福利，但减排行为可能会抵消这种非外部性。此外，如果主体对增长评价很高，认为没有必要进行减排，那么她从增长中获益很大。因此，一个自然的猜想是，增长通常会提高福利，尤其是穷人的福利。通过明确地纳入优化减排行为，我们证明了该猜想并不一定有效。也就是说，贫富差距的缩小可能不会改善环境的质量，甚至会伤害到面临角落解决方案的穷人。我们还表明，如果全球经济增长严重恶化了环境，那么贫困国家将受到伤害，减排技术非常低效，贫困国家数量众多。