Economic analysis of the minimum auction price

本文的主要研究对象是评估民事执行制度中最低拍卖价格制度的经济效率，这是当今日本规制改革争论的热点问题之一。我的研究结果可以总结如下。首先，比较分析告诉我们，MAP不是从日本民事执行原则如清算原则或残值原则中逻辑推导出来的绝对必要性。特别是90年代末美国止赎权改革的经验、争议和制度结果，给了我们另一种追讨债务的房地产清算的可能性。其次，将公司融资理论应用于房地产融资，发现MAP仅是确定抵押物定价控制权的次优解。因此，由拍卖博弈论制定的有效保留价格的正式准则不能直接适用于MAP。第三，利用最近在东京和大阪地方法院进行的1500多起司法拍卖案件的数据集进行统计分析，发现抵押品拍卖中的竞争压力是避免MAP反常效应的关键因素。

The main object of this research is to evaluate the economic efficiency of an institution in civil execution system, the Minimum Auction Price (MAP hereinafter), which has been one of the hot issues in the regulation reform debate in Japan today. The result from my research can be summarized as follows.First, a comparative account tells us that the MAP is not absolute necessity derived logically from the principles of Japanese civil execution, such as the liquidation principle, or the residual value principle. Especially the experiences disputes and institutional outcomes in the foreclosure reform in the USA in late 90s gives us a hint for another possibility of real estate liquidation for the debt collection.Second, applying a corporate finance theory to the real estate finance, we find that the MAP is only a second best solution to determine the control right over price setting of the collateral. The formal guideline for the efficient reserve price, formulated by the Auction Game theory, therefore, cannot be directly applied to the MAP.Third, a statistical analysis, using the data sets of more than 1500 cases from judicial sales recently operated in the Tokyo and Osaka District Court reveals, that the competition pressure in the collateral auction is a key element to avoid the perverse effect of the MAP.