a Theoretical and Positive Study on Pro-Patent Policy and Competition Policy of Economic Performance in Information Technologies

信息技术经济绩效的支持专利政策和竞争政策的理论和实证研究

• 批准号: 14530066
• 负责人: SHINKAI Tetsuya
• 金额: $ 1.28万
• 依托单位: Kobe City Universities of Foreign Studies
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2002 至 2003
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-14530066/
• 关键词: R&D investment; completely complementary technologies; (cross-)licensing system; duopoly; compensation for damages; 特許保護範囲; 損害賠償額; 特許権侵害; (クロス)ライセンシング制度; 技術開発投資競争; 特許の保護範囲

In this study, we consider the R&D investment competition of the two duopolistic firms in both weakly complementary technologies economy and completely complementary technologies. In the former economy, we assume that each firm can produce goods without both of the two technologies but it incurs more redundant costs than that in the case each or both of the technologies may be available for it. By the latter economy, we assume that no firm can produce the goods without both of the technologies. For these two cases, we derive the investments competition equilibria in R&D of the two technologies with and without the (cross-) licensing system. By comparing of the R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the (cross-) licensing system discourages the R&D investments when the duopolistic firms can produce goods by using of the two weakly (completely) complementary technologies. Furthermore, we consider the R&D investments competition game of the two duopolistic firms which independently invest in the new integrated technology of the two existing complementary technologies to produce the good. Each firm has the patent of one of the two old technologies. If each firm produces the product and supplies it without license contract held by another firm, it incurs the compensation for damages in either by use of the new integrated technology developed by it or the existing technology patented by its rival. We show the existence of symmetric Nash equilibria in the game. We also present a necessary and sufficient condition for local stability of the symmetric equilibria.

在本研究中，我们考虑了弱互补技术经济和完全互补技术经济中两个双寡头企业的研发投资竞争。在前一种经济中，我们假设每个企业都可以在没有这两种技术的情况下生产商品，但与同时使用这两种技术或同时使用这两种技术的情况相比，它会产生更多的冗余成本。对于后一种经济，我们假设如果没有这两种技术，任何公司都无法生产产品。对于这两种情况，我们得出了有和没有（交叉）许可制度的两种技术的研发投资竞争均衡。通过比较两个均衡下的研发投资水平，我们表明，当双寡头企业可以利用两种弱（完全）互补的技术生产商品时，（交叉）许可制度会抑制研发投资。此外，我们考虑了两个双寡头公司的研发投资竞争博弈，这两个公司独立投资于两种现有互补技术的新集成技术来生产产品。每家公司都拥有这两项旧技术之一的专利。如果每个公司在没有其他公司持有许可合同的情况下生产和供应该产品，则该公司将因使用其开发的新集成技术或其竞争对手的现有专利技术而遭受损害赔偿。我们证明了博弈中对称纳什均衡的存在。我们还提出了对称平衡局部稳定性的充分必要条件。

项目成果

Tanaka, S., M.Okamura, T.Shinkai: "The Compensation for Damages of Patent Litigation and Incentives of R&D Investment under Complementary Technologies, (in Japanese)"The Journal of Social Science (Institute of Social Science University of Tokyo). vol.55,N

Tanaka, S.、M.Okamura、T.Shinkai：“专利诉讼损害赔偿与 R 的激励

田中悟, 岡村誠, 新海哲哉: "補完的技術革新下での損害賠償額と研究開発インセンティブ"社会科学研究(東京大学社会科学研究所). 55巻. 3-16 (2004)

田中悟、冈村真、新海哲也：“互补技术创新下的损害赔偿和研发激励”社会科学研究（东京大学社会科学研究所）第55卷3-16（2004年）。

新海哲哉, 岡村誠, 田中悟: "補完的技術革新下における研究開発競争と特許保護政策"神戸外大論叢. 第53巻4号. 73-87 (2002)

Tetsuya Shinkai、Makoto Okamura、Satoru Tanaka：“互补技术创新下的研发竞争与专利保护政策”Kobe Gaidai Ronsen Vol. 53，No. 73-87 (2002)。

Okamura M., T.Shinkai, S.Tanaka: "A Cross-licensing System Discourages R&D Investments in Completely Complementary Technologies"Working Paper Series (Kobe City University of Foreign Studies). No.0014. 1-16 (2002)

Okamura M.、T.Shinkai、S.Tanaka：“交叉许可系统不鼓励 R

Ohkawa, T., T.Shinkai, M.Okamura, S.Tanaka: "Optimal Patentability Standards for Patent Breadth and Non-Obviousness Patentability Standards under Essential Innovations"Discussion Paper Series in Economics,03002,Ritsumeikan Univsersity. 1-18 (2003)

Ohkawa, T., T.Shinkai, M.Okamura, S.Tanaka：“关键创新下专利宽度的最优专利性标准和非显而易见性专利性标准”经济学讨论论文系列，03002，立命馆大学。