A Theoretical and Empirical Study on Financial Structure, CorporateControl and Oligopolistic Market Competition

金融结构、公司控制与寡头垄断市场竞争的理论与实证研究

• 批准号: 22530251
• 负责人: SHINKAI Tetsuya
• 金额: $ 2.75万
• 依托单位: Kwansei Gakuin University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2010 至 2012
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-22530251/
• 关键词: 有限責任; 無限責任; 権限委譲; 企業統治; 企業の行動目的; 寡占市場; Cournot寡占; 権限移譲; 寡占競争; 企業金融; Cournot複占; 経済厚生; 企業目的選択の内生化

We examine an effect of limited liability on strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. We establish that owners of each firm always delegate their tasks, decisions, and responsibility to a manager under limited liability, while they do not always do so underunlimited liability. In addition, we construct a two-stage game in that the first stage, each of the oligopolistic firms chooses its business organizational form, while in the second stage each behaves in a Cournot fashion. We established that (1) even if an unlimited liability firm is viable, all firms become limited liability entities in equilibrium, and (2) the equilibrium industry configuration, where all firmsbecome limited liability entities, achieves efficiency in the second-best sense.

我们研究了有限责任对需要不确定性的古尔诺·伯诺（Cournot Dopoly）中战略代表团的影响。我们确定，每个公司的所有者总是在有限责任下向经理委派其任务，决定和责任，而他们并不总是这样做的责任不足。此外，我们在第一阶段构建了一个两阶段的游戏，每个寡头公司都选择其业务组织形式，而在第二阶段，每种阶段都以古尔诺（Cournot）方式行事。我们确定（1）即使无限责任公司可行，所有公司都将成为有限的责任实体，以及（2）平衡行业的配置，在所有公司中，所有公司都有有限责任实体，在第二大含义上都能达到效率。

项目成果

Delegation and Limited Liability in a Modern Capitalistic Economy

现代资本主义经济中的授权和有限责任

• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, KwanseiGakuin University
• 作者: Tetsuya Shinkai;Takao Ohkawa;MakotoOkamura and Kozo Harimaya
• 通讯作者: MakotoOkamura and Kozo Harimaya

Endogenous Determination of Business Organizational Form : Company Limited vs.Partnership

企业组织形式的内生决定：股份有限公司与合伙企业

• 发表时间: 2011
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series No.11002, Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University
• 作者: Tetsuya Shinkai;Takao Ohkawa,;Makoto Okamura;Kozo Harimaya;Takao Ohkawa
• 通讯作者: Takao Ohkawa

The Tragedy of the Anti-commons in the Long Run in a Common-resource Economy

公共资源经济中长期反公地的悲剧

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00571.x
• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Japanese Economic Review
• 影响因子: 1.2
• 作者: Takao Ohkawa;Tetsuya Shinkai;Makoto Okamura;Kozo Harimaya
• 通讯作者: Kozo Harimaya

Why did the Dutch East India Co. outperform the British East India Co.? —A theoretical explanation based on the objective of the firm and limited liability—

为什么荷兰东印度公司的表现优于英国东印度公司——基于公司和有限责任目标的理论解释——

• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
• 作者: Tetsuya Shinkai;Takao Ohkawa; Makoto Okamura and Kozo Harimaya
• 通讯作者: Makoto Okamura and Kozo Harimaya