A Theoretical and Empirical Study on Financial Structure, CorporateControl and Oligopolistic Market Competition

我们考察了需求不确定的古诺双寡头垄断中有限责任对战略委托的影响。我们确定，每家公司的所有者总是将他们的任务、决策和责任委托给有限责任的经理，而他们并不总是在无限责任下这样做。此外，我们还构建了一个两阶段博弈模型，在第一阶段，寡头垄断企业各自选择自己的企业组织形式，而在第二阶段，每个寡头垄断企业的行为都是古诺行为。我们确定：(1)即使无限责任公司是可行的，所有公司在均衡中成为有限责任实体，以及(2)均衡行业结构，其中所有公司成为有限责任实体，在次优意义上实现效率。

We examine an effect of limited liability on strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. We establish that owners of each firm always delegate their tasks, decisions, and responsibility to a manager under limited liability, while they do not always do so underunlimited liability. In addition, we construct a two-stage game in that the first stage, each of the oligopolistic firms chooses its business organizational form, while in the second stage each behaves in a Cournot fashion. We established that (1) even if an unlimited liability firm is viable, all firms become limited liability entities in equilibrium, and (2) the equilibrium industry configuration, where all firmsbecome limited liability entities, achieves efficiency in the second-best sense.