An Theoretical Analysis on the Effects of Organization and Corporate Governance Modes of Firms on Oligopolistic Competition

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In this study, we consider a la Cournot models in which oligopolistic firms with various objectives and modes of corporate governance competes. We explore how the difference of the objectives and modes of corporate governance of firms affects the strategic behavior of firms and the outcomes and welfare in the equilibrium. In particular, we analyze a la Cournot oligopoly which is composed of firms with a certain type of objective and modes of corporate finance, that is, equity value maximizer (EVM) firms or debt value maximizer (DVM) firms, sales maximize (SM) firms under limited liability and profit maxmizer (PMND) firms with no debt, and also consider a la Cournot oligopoly which is composed of firms with various distinct types of those. By comparing these equilibria, we obtain some insights on properties and welfare equilibrium outcomes.