Game Theoretical Foundation of Collusion : Factors other than self-interests and role of private information

共谋的博弈论基础：自身利益以外的因素和私人信息的作用

• 批准号: 15330036
• 负责人: MATSUSHIMA Hitoshi
• 金额: $ 6.59万
• 依托单位: The University of Tokyo
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2003 至 2005
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15330036/
• 关键词: Implementation; Mechanism design; Moral Preference; Auction; Market Microstructure; Detail-Free Mechanism; Incentive; Game Theory; mechanism design; implementation; honesty; market microstructure; group incentive; repeated games; Nash equili

I investigated the possibility of collusion and competition by using the approaches of mechanism design and repeated games. I took into account explicitly the fact that real individuals do not necessarily behave for their own material interests, the fact that they are influenced by information about factors irrelevant to their material interests, and the fact that they use private information and are limited to access public information. The most important contributions are the paper entitled "Repeated Games with Private monitoring : Two Players," which was published in Econometrica as a regular article and the paper entitled "Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance", which was accepted in Journal of Economic Theory as a regular article. Both journals are top among the economics theory journals. Other papers such as "Role of Honesty in Implementation" is related to the issue of the problem of factors other than the material interests. The papers entitled "Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rationality", which was published in Japanese Economic Review, was written as the lecture article for the Nakahana Awards of the Japanese economic association.

本文运用机制设计和重复博弈的方法研究了企业间合谋和竞争的可能性。我明确地考虑到了这样一个事实：真实的个人不一定为自己的物质利益而行动;他们受到与其物质利益无关的因素的信息的影响;他们使用私人信息，并被限制访问公共信息。最重要的贡献是题为“有私人监督的重复博弈：两个参与者”的论文，该论文作为定期文章发表在《计量经济学》上，以及题为“附带支付的机制设计：个人理性和迭代支配”的论文，该论文作为定期文章被《经济理论杂志》接受。这两本杂志都是经济学理论期刊中的佼佼者。其他论文如《诚信在执行中的作用》则涉及到物质利益以外的因素问题。发表在《日本经济评论》上的题为“无细节的机制设计与合理性”的论文被作为日本经济学会Nakahana奖的演讲文章撰写。

项目成果

Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance

附带支付的机制设计：个体理性与迭代主导

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Theory 133巻1号
• 作者: Tetsuji Okazaki;Michiru Sawada and Kewang;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima

モデルの細部から独立なメカニズムデザインと合理性について : 平成16年度日本経済学会第10回中原賞授賞記念講演

论独立于模型细节的机制设计和合理性：纪念2004年第10届日本经济协会中原奖的演讲

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 現代経済学の潮流2005(東洋経済新報社) 10巻
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉
• 通讯作者: 松島斉

Book Review : "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare I, edited by K.Arrow, A.Sen, and K.Suzumura, Elsevier, 2002".

书评：“社会选择与福利手册 I，由 K.Arrow、A.Sen 和 K.Suzumura 编辑，爱思唯尔，2002 年”。

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Literature 42
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima

ナッシュは何を見たか : 純粋数学とゲーム理論

纳什看到了什么纯数学和博弈论？

• 发表时间: 2005
• 作者: 松島斉;落合卓四郎 翻訳(H. W.クーン;S.ナサー著)
• 通讯作者: S.ナサー著)

Large Market Design in Dominance

大市场设计占据主导地位

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Discussion Paper Series, University of Tokyo, CIRJE F-346
• 作者: Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;Hitoshi Matsushima;松島斉;Hitoshi Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Hitoshi Matsushima