Mechanism Design for Avoiding Social Dilemma-From the Stand point of Game Theory and Experimental Economics-

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The aim of this project is to propose mechanisms which implement desirable outcomes in various social dilemma situations such as information trading, provision of public goods, environmental pollution, etc. The project started with three members, Muto, Yamato and Hidano. Muto developed game theoretical models and studied applicability of "stable set", a solution concept in cooperative game theory, to social dilemma problems. Yamato designed mechanisms to implement desirable outcomes and evaluated their performance by conducting experiments. Hidano incorporated agents' utility and their changes into the mechanisms. Then two other members joined. Higuchi conducted statistical and econometric study of social dilemma problems ; and Yamamuro overviewed historical developments of mechanisms to solve social dilemma problems. Principal findings are summarized as follows :1. Make clear the stable set outcomes when agents behave with farsightedness in social dilemma situations.2. On the basis of the outcomes in 1, design mechanisms to prevent free-riding in provision of public goods and to prevent overproduction of information.3. Examine performance of the mechanisms by conducting experiments; and find that agents behave coalitionally, which was not expected.4. Design new mechanisms which take into account coalition formation among agents.5. Examine performance of the new mechanisms; and find that they work well to prevent social dilemmas.