Social Dilemma and Emergence of Cooperation

社会困境与合作的出现

• 批准号: 09680428
• 负责人: MUTO Shigeo
• 金额: $ 1.92万
• 依托单位: Tokyo Institute of Technology (1998-1999)Tokyo Metropolitan University (1997)
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 1997 至 1999
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-09680428/
• 关键词: social dilemma; prisoner's dilemma; cooperation; game theory; stable set; stationary equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; individual rationality; 湖の汚染

This research studies prisoner's dilemma and social dilemma from the standpoint of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets with farsightedness of players. The following are the main results.1 Prisoner's dilemma: When two players behave independently, the unique stable set consists of two states: both cooperate or both defect. If mixed strategies are allowed, every pair of mixed strategies is included in a stable set. When they are allowed to communicate, even though agreements are not binding, there exists a unique stable set consisting of one outcome : both cooperate. If players use mixed strategies, all stable sets consist of Pareto optimal outcomes. Moreover, stationary equlibria in an alternating-move prisoner's dilemma game provide us with similar outcomes as stable sets.2 Social dilemma: In a social dilemma (a prisoner's dilemma with many players), even though no agreement among players is binding, outcomes in any stables set are Pareto optimal and individually rational.

本研究从冯·诺依曼-摩根斯坦稳定集的角度出发，以玩家的远见来研究囚徒困境和社会困境。主要结果如下： 1 囚徒困境：当两个参与者独立行动时，唯一的稳定集由两种状态组成：双方合作或双方背叛。如果允许混合策略，则每对混合策略都包含在一个稳定集中。当他们被允许进行交流时，即使协议不具有约束力，也存在一个由一个结果组成的独特的稳定集：双方合作。如果玩家使用混合策略，则所有稳定集都包含帕累托最优结果。此外，交替移动囚徒困境博弈中的平稳均衡为我们提供了与稳定集类似的结果。2 社会困境：在社会困境（有许多参与者的囚徒困境）中，即使参与者之间没有达成具有约束力的协议，任何稳定集的结果都是帕累托最优且个体理性的。

项目成果

A. Suzuki and S. Muto: "Farsighted Stability in Prisoner's Dilemma"Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan. to appear). (2000)

A. Suzuki 和 S. Muto：《囚徒困境中的远见稳定》日本运筹学会杂志。

S. Muto: "The Banzhat Index in Representative Systems with Multiple Political Parties"Games and Economic Behavior. 28. 73-104 (1999)

S. Muto：“多政党代议制中的 Banzhat 指数”博弈与经济行为。

A.Suzuki and S.Muto: "Farsighted Stability in Prisoner's Dilemma" VALDES Research Paper No.4,Tokyo Institute of Technology. (1998)

A.Suzuki 和 S.Muto：“囚徒困境中的远见稳定”VALDES 研究论文第 4 号，东京工业大学。

S. Muto: "The Banzhaf Index in Representative Systems with Multiple Political Parties"Games and Economic Behavior. Vol. 28. 73-104 (1999)

S. Muto：“多政党代议制中的班扎夫指数”博弈与经济行为。

S. Muto: "Von Neumann-Morgenstem Stablity and Its Applications"The Current State of Business Disciplines. Vol. 2. (2000)

S. Muto：“冯·诺依曼-摩根斯坦稳定性及其应用”商业学科的现状。