Game Theoretic Analysis of Social Dilemma

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This research studies social dilemma in socio-economic systems from the viewpoint of farsighted stable set and of fuzzy game theory concept. The following are main results.1 Developing relations between stable sets (and consistent sets) and stationary equilibrium points in a bargaining game, I define a new and more appropriate solution concept to social dilemma situations. I verify its effectiveness applying it to several social dilemma cases.2 I study dynamic coalition formation process by the use of stable sets and the Shapley value. In particular I pick up the Hosokawa anti-LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) cabinet formed in 1993. In the static analysis it was already shown that this cabinet was the only stable coalition. Our dynamic analysis newly reveals that in case the LDP has an initiative in negotiation then pro-LDP cabinet can be formed though the Hosokawa cabinet is formed when an anti-LDP has an initiative.3 Analysis of dilemma situations from the viewpoint of fuzzy games gives us a new insight into the problem how to avoid social dilemmas.