Design and Evaluation of Internet Auction Protocols robust against cheatings

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This project designs and examines combinatorial auction protocols which are(almost)robust against a variety of cheatings on the Internet.We focused on a data transfer on ad hoc networks, such as P2P networks and distributed sensor networks. We first show that existing auction protocols are influenced by false-name manipulations. More precisely, an owner of nodes can pretend that a node is in fact a set of multiple nodes, or all of which must be purchased from different owners. We proposed and analyzed a false-name-proof mechanism, where an owner may have multiple elements. We presented those results at WI- 2007On the other hand, we developed the Agent-Community-based Peer-to-Peer Information Retrieval(ACP2P)method. This method uses agent communities to manage and look up information of interest to users. An agent works as a delegate of its user and searches for information that the user wants by communicating with other agents. We presented those results at WI-2007In addition, we conducted multi-agent simulations and subject experiments in recycle markets, monopolistic intermediary markets, and so on. Though those results depend on a specific market situation, we extended subject's decision-making models and successfully reproduce subject behavior in the multi-agent simulations. Also, we presented lots of papers in false-name-proof auction protocol and cooperative games in journals and conferences.Finally,as an integration of our results,we study automated mechanism design,as a mechanism design technique,for new mechanisms on the Internet Mechanism has traditionally been designed manually for classes of problems.In automated mechanism design,a mechanism can be automatically designed using constrained optimization technique. Our results are expected to develop and examine more rapidly and better mechanisms for actual human and massively multiagent systems.