Design and Evaluation of Internet Auction Protocols robust against cheatings

抗作弊的互联网拍卖协议的设计和评估

• 批准号: 17300049
• 负责人: YOKOO Makoto
• 金额: $ 10.39万
• 依托单位: Kyushu University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2005 至 2007
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17300049/
• 关键词: Auctions; Electronic Commerce; Multi-agent; Experimental Economics

This project designs and examines combinatorial auction protocols which are(almost)robust against a variety of cheatings on the Internet.We focused on a data transfer on ad hoc networks, such as P2P networks and distributed sensor networks. We first show that existing auction protocols are influenced by false-name manipulations. More precisely, an owner of nodes can pretend that a node is in fact a set of multiple nodes, or all of which must be purchased from different owners. We proposed and analyzed a false-name-proof mechanism, where an owner may have multiple elements. We presented those results at WI- 2007On the other hand, we developed the Agent-Community-based Peer-to-Peer Information Retrieval(ACP2P)method. This method uses agent communities to manage and look up information of interest to users. An agent works as a delegate of its user and searches for information that the user wants by communicating with other agents. We presented those results at WI-2007In addition, we conducted multi-agent simulations and subject experiments in recycle markets, monopolistic intermediary markets, and so on. Though those results depend on a specific market situation, we extended subject's decision-making models and successfully reproduce subject behavior in the multi-agent simulations. Also, we presented lots of papers in false-name-proof auction protocol and cooperative games in journals and conferences.Finally,as an integration of our results,we study automated mechanism design,as a mechanism design technique,for new mechanisms on the Internet Mechanism has traditionally been designed manually for classes of problems.In automated mechanism design,a mechanism can be automatically designed using constrained optimization technique. Our results are expected to develop and examine more rapidly and better mechanisms for actual human and massively multiagent systems.

该项目设计并检查了组合拍卖协议，该协议（几乎）对互联网上的各种作弊行为具有鲁棒性。我们专注于临时网络上的数据传输，例如 P2P 网络和分布式传感器网络。我们首先表明现有的拍卖协议受到假名操纵的影响。更准确地说，节点的所有者可以假装一个节点实际上是多个节点的集合，或者所有节点都必须从不同的所有者那里购买。我们提出并分析了一种防伪机制，其中一个所有者可能有多个元素。我们在 WI-2007 上展示了这些结果。另一方面，我们开发了基于 Agent-Community 的点对点信息检索（ACP2P）方法。该方法使用代理社区来管理和查找用户感兴趣的信息。代理充当其用户的代表，并通过与其他代理通信来搜索用户想要的信息。我们在 WI-2007 上展示了这些结果。此外，我们在回收市场、垄断中间市场等方面进行了多主体模拟和主题实验。尽管这些结果取决于特定的市场情况，但我们扩展了受试者的决策模型，并在多智能体模拟中成功地重现了受试者的行为。此外，我们在期刊和会议上发表了大量关于防伪拍卖协议和合作博弈的论文。最后，作为我们成果的整合，我们研究了自动化机制设计，作为一种机制设计技术，针对互联网上的新机制，传统上机制是针对各类问题进行手动设计的。在自动化机制设计中，可以使用约束优化技术自动设计机制。我们的结果有望为实际人类和大规模多智能体系统开发和检查更快速、更好的机制。

项目成果

マルチエージェントシステムのための基盤ネットワーク構成手法

多Agent系统的基本网络配置方法

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: 電子情報通信学会 J90
• 作者: 木村 功作;雨宮 聡史;峯 恒憲;雨宮 真人
• 通讯作者: 雨宮 真人

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

开放匿名环境中联盟博弈的紧凑表示方案

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: Twenty-first National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2006)
• 作者: Naoki Ohta;Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo;Kohki Maruono;Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm
• 通讯作者: Tuomas Sandholm

Multiply constrained distributed constraint optimization

乘法约束分布式约束优化

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2006)
• 作者: Emma Bowring;Milind Tambe;Makoto Yokoo
• 通讯作者: Makoto Yokoo

Making VCG More Robust in Combinatorial Auctions via Submodular Approximation

通过子模逼近使 VCG 在组合拍卖中更加稳健

• 发表时间: 2007
• 作者: Makoto Yokoo;and Atsushi Iwasaki
• 通讯作者: and Atsushi Iwasaki

「メカニズムデザイン」担当, 進化経済学ハンドブック

负责《进化经济学手册》《机制设计》

• 发表时间: 2006
• 作者: Takashi Washio;Akito Sakurai;Katsuto Nakajima;Hideaki Takeda;Satoshi Tojo;Makoto Yokoo;岩崎 敦
• 通讯作者: 岩崎 敦