Managing Regional Economic Risks due to the Entry and Exit of Global Firms

本研究提出了一种理论，即全球公司进入/离开当地城市的行为放大了区域经济的全球经济风险。该理论采用动态期权博弈的框架来描述土地所有者对跨国公司进入/退出当地城市的战略行为。分析表明，当经济因素的波动性足够小时，房东的均衡策略是允许企业立即进入，而在企业自由退出规则下的均衡中，房东会随着波动性的增加而提高租金，以弥补由于企业退出风险的增加而导致的预期收益的减少。比较土地所有者的可能的战略，我们进一步揭示，不赋予企业的退出选择是帕累托优势战略的意义上，企业以及土地所有者是更好的。

This study presents a theory that the entry and exit behavior of global firms to/from a local city amplifies global economic risks to a regional economy. The theory employs the dynamic option game framework for capturing landwoner's starategic behaviors against the entry/exit of a global firm to a local city. The analysis reveals that the landlord's equilibrium strategy is to permit the firm's entry immediately when the volatility of the economic factor is sufficiently small, and that in the equilibrium under the firm's free exit rule, the landlord raises the rent as the volatility increases to cover the decrease in his expected revenue due to the increase in the risk of firm's exit. Comparing landowner's possible strategies, we further disclose that not endowing the firm with the exit option is the Pareto dominant strategy in the sense that the firm as well as the landowner are better off.