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A Study in the Generating-Expanding Process and the Causes of Financial Institution's Poor Support to their Bad Loans in 1990s' Japan

20世纪90年代日本生成扩张过程及金融机构不良贷款支持不良的原因研究

基本信息

批准号：
17530172
负责人：
MIWA Yoshiro
金额：
$ 1.18万
依托单位：
The University of Tokyo
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Focusing on the second half of 1990s, about two years in particular beginning in the end of 1997, this study investigates the working mechanism and actual figures of Japan's financial markets in (alleged) troubles and confusion. This period, often called as the time of "Credit Crunch" or "Financial Crisis", is regarded as the climax of Japan's economy wide troubles caused by financial institution's poor support to bad loans generated and expanded during "the Bubble Years" in the 1980s. Now the dominant view remembers this period as a case for successful policy intervention with which Japan began the recovering process from a decade-length serious trouble with bank's bad loans. Upon this view, recently, they make policy recommendations to central banks and governments in developed countries fallen in sub-prime loan troubles. Nobody, however, has shown with persuasive evidence the seriousness of the "Crunch" or "Crisis" and confirmed empirically the effectiveness of the policy intervention during this period. Casual observation of macro data causes doubts on the seriousness of the "Credit Crunch" and therefore the policy effectiveness.Using huge set of micro-data on financing behavior of individual firms, from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly (Hojin Kigyo Tokei Chosa, Kiho), this study empirically confirms that there was no such serious situation that should be called "Credit Crunch" or "Financial Crisis". Without any serious disease, no policy intervention could be effective. This conclusion suggests that the success story of Japans policy during the "Financial Crisis" period is a myth, which would create a momentum for new researches on the Japans bad loans controversy.The Final Report of the study is downloadable from the Ministry of Finance's homepage : http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/soken/toukei.htm

本研究以90年代后半期，特别是从1997年底开始的近两年时间为研究对象，考察了日本金融市场陷入困境和混乱的运行机制和实际情况。这一时期通常被称为“信贷紧缩”或“金融危机”时期，被认为是20世纪80年代“泡沫年代”期间，由于金融机构对不良贷款的支持不力而导致日本经济陷入困境的高潮。现在，主流观点认为，这一时期是成功的政策干预的一个案例，日本正是凭借这一政策，开始了从长达十年的银行不良贷款严重问题中复苏的过程。基于这一观点，最近，他们向陷入次贷危机的发达国家的中央银行和政府提出了政策建议。然而，没有人能用有说服力的证据证明“紧缩”或“危机”的严重性，也没有人能从经验上证实这一时期政策干预的有效性。对宏观数据的随意观察，会使人们对“信用紧缩”的严重性和政策效果产生怀疑。本研究使用《企业财务报表统计季刊》（《法人京行定期统计》、《纪报》）中有关企业融资行为的大量微观数据，从经验上证实了“信用紧缩”或“金融危机”的严重性并不存在。如果没有严重的疾病，任何政策干预都不会有效。这一结论表明，日本在“金融危机”期间的政策成功故事是一个神话，这将为日本不良贷款争议的新研究创造动力。研究的最终报告可从财务省的主页下载：http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/soken/toukei.htm