Multipopulation Evolutionary Game Model with Taxation and Subsidization, and Its Application to Selfish Routing

我们提出了一个模型的相互作用多个种群的自私的球员。在我们的模型中，政府试图通过税收和补贴将所有人口控制在一个理想的目标状态。研究了目标态的稳定条件。我们已经建模的自私的路由在multisbranchsingle-sink网络作为一个多种群的进化博弈。在该模型中，我们研究了由博弈者的自私行为引起的Braess悖论的发生条件。

We have proposed a model of interactions among multiple populations of selfish players. In our model, the government tries to control all populations to a desirable target state by taxations and subsidizations. The stabilization condition of the target state has been investigated. We have modeled the selfish routing in multisource single-sink networks as a multipopulation evolutionary game. In the model, we have investigated the occurrence condition of Braess paradox which is caused by selfish behaviors of players.