A New Direction in Market Design: Studies on Non-two-sided Matchings
A New Direction in Market Design: Studies on Non-two-sided Matchings
批准号:
23730188
负责人:
TAKAMIYA Koji
金额:
$2.58万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
财政年份:
2011
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2011 至 2013
中文摘要
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英文摘要
Applications of matching theory to mechanism design have recently brought significant improvements to real-life institutions for resource allocation. But these applications are mostly based on a specific class of matching models. Aiming at expanding the applicability of matching mechanisms, our research analyzed, with the aid of computer simulation, some classes of matching models which had not been much considered in application. We have obtained some theoretical results; one of our results has made more flexible certain preceding conditions for truthful revelation of preferences in matching mechanisms.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
DOI:
10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x
发表时间:
2013
期刊:
International Journal of Game Theory
影响因子:
0.6
作者:
[Koji Takamiya, Akira Tanaka, Koji TAKAMIYA]
通讯作者:
Koji TAKAMIYA
Foundations for monotonicity -type results in matchings
匹配中单调性类型结果的基础
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Koji TAKAMIYA, Akira TANAKA, 高宮浩司]
通讯作者:
高宮浩司
A new method in matching market design by means of approximation mechanisms
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批准号:21730155
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项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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资助金额:$2.16万
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财政年份:2009
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负责人:TAKAMIYA Koji
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依托单位:
海外基金