A New Direction in Market Design: Studies on Non-two-sided Matchings

市场设计的新方向：非双边匹配研究

• 批准号: 23730188
• 负责人: TAKAMIYA Koji
• 金额: $ 2.58万
• 依托单位: Niigata University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23730188/
• 关键词: マーケットデザイン; メカニズムデザイン; 社会選択; ゲーム理論; マッチング; ミクロ経済学; 経済理論; 提携形成

Applications of matching theory to mechanism design have recently brought significant improvements to real-life institutions for resource allocation. But these applications are mostly based on a specific class of matching models. Aiming at expanding the applicability of matching mechanisms, our research analyzed, with the aid of computer simulation, some classes of matching models which had not been much considered in application. We have obtained some theoretical results; one of our results has made more flexible certain preceding conditions for truthful revelation of preferences in matching mechanisms.

匹配理论在机制设计中的应用最近为现实生活中的资源分配制度带来了重大改进。但这些应用大多基于特定的匹配模型。为了扩大匹配机制的适用范围，本文借助计算机仿真的方法，对几类在实际应用中尚未得到充分考虑的匹配模型进行了分析。我们得到了一些理论结果，其中一个结果使得匹配机制中偏好真实揭示的某些前置条件更加灵活。

项目成果

Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems

联盟形成问题中的联盟一致与策略验证

• DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x
• 发表时间: 2013
• 期刊: International Journal of Game Theory
• 影响因子: 0.6
• 作者: Koji Takamiya;Akira Tanaka;Koji TAKAMIYA
• 通讯作者: Koji TAKAMIYA

Foundations for monotonicity -type results in matchings

匹配中单调性类型结果的基础

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: Koji TAKAMIYA;Akira TANAKA;高宮浩司
• 通讯作者: 高宮浩司