A new method in matching market design by means of approximation mechanisms

匹配机制作为一种不使用价格体系的新的资源分配手段，最近已被应用到现实世界中。本研究旨在通过设计新的机构来扩大匹配机构的适用性。我们考察了在应用中没有被太多考虑的匹配类型，并用计算机模拟和理论分析的方法研究了它们的数学性质。我们已经得到了一些理论结果，其中包括一个重要的结果，即决定“NICE”机制的可用性的计算复杂性。这一结果是在一次国际会议上报告的。

Matching mechanisms have recently been applied to the real-world use as a new means of resource allocation which does not utilize the price system. The present research aimed at expanding the applicability of matching mechanisms by designing new mechanisms. We looked at the types of matching which had not been much considered in application, and investigated their mathematical properties by means of both computer simulation and theoretical analysis. We have obtained some theoretical results including a significant one concerning the computational complexity in deciding the availability of "nice" mechanisms. This result was reported at an international conference.