A new method in matching market design by means of approximation mechanisms

一种利用逼近机制匹配市场设计的新方法

• 批准号: 21730155
• 负责人: TAKAMIYA Koji
• 金额: $ 2.16万
• 依托单位: Niigata University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2009 至 2010
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-21730155/
• 关键词: ミクロ経済学; 経済理論; メカニズムデザイン; マーケットデザイン

Matching mechanisms have recently been applied to the real-world use as a new means of resource allocation which does not utilize the price system. The present research aimed at expanding the applicability of matching mechanisms by designing new mechanisms. We looked at the types of matching which had not been much considered in application, and investigated their mathematical properties by means of both computer simulation and theoretical analysis. We have obtained some theoretical results including a significant one concerning the computational complexity in deciding the availability of "nice" mechanisms. This result was reported at an international conference.

匹配机制作为一种不依赖价格体系的新的资源配置手段，近年来被应用到现实世界中。本研究旨在通过设计新的机构来扩展匹配机构的适用性。我们研究了在实际应用中未被充分考虑的匹配类型，并通过计算机模拟和理论分析研究了它们的数学性质。我们已经得到了一些理论结果，包括一个重要的计算复杂性，在决定的“好”机制的可用性。这一结果在一次国际会议上得到了报道。

项目成果

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Complexity Consideration on the Existence of Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions

• 作者: Koji Takamiya