Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy, 1932-45

这一研究项目的主要目标是完成一本专著，坚定地将希特勒前大使兼外交部长约阿希姆·冯·里宾特洛普的观点、活动和影响置于20世纪30年代和40年代的国际事态发展的背景下。里宾特洛夫在第二次世界大战的史学中是一个备受诟病的人物。在学术和通俗文学中，他几乎无一例外地被描绘成一个缺乏想法和主动性的人，一个希特勒的奴隶仆人，一个无能的轻量级人物，一个外交上的无名小卒。然而，即使在当时，人们也承认他与希特勒有着无与伦比的亲密关系，希特勒在第三帝国时代的大部分时间里都是希特勒的密友和外交事务顾问。此外，正如同时代的人也认识到的那样，里宾特洛普与希特勒的关系为他提供了无与伦比的机会来影响后者的思想和政策决策，无论是通过交流或隐瞒重要信息(例如，关于1939年英国作战意愿的信息)，还是通过对任何特定问题的持续讨论。这项研究中提出的一个关键论点是，里宾特洛普对希特勒1938-1919年决策的影响比之前认为的要大得多；事实上，考虑到他自己的政治议程，里宾特洛普在1939年故意试图误导纳粹领导人，以便在英国和德国之间挑起冲突。希特勒最初绕过传统的外交渠道，在国外执行重要的非官方任务，包括早在1933年就与英国和法国领导人进行亲密谈判，后来又提拔他担任越来越负责任和更有影响力的职位，最终担任了帝国外交部长一职，他担任了七年，这本身就表明，里宾特洛普现象比表面上看到的要多得多。这当然表明，早就应该认真重新评估这个人对国际关系的贡献，他在国际关系中发挥了如此不可或缺的作用。这本书将追溯里宾特洛普对国家社会主义的关注，并详细介绍他在国际外交领域的众多和不同的尝试。它将提供有关他在国际事务中的非官方倡议的急需的信息，如他赞助英国、法国和德国的退伍军人之间的关系，以及他促进互惠的文化组织和交流；它将努力解释里宾特洛普与希特勒之间以及里宾特洛普与其他纳粹领导人之间关系的性质，在第三帝国的外交决策过程中；它将深入分析里宾特洛普发展的另一种政治和含蓄的军事战略，该战略旨在迎合希特勒在英德关系领域最初计划的失败；它将特别强调德苏日合作在里宾特洛夫政治思想中的作用；它将令人信服地挑战其主体对国家社会主义外交政策制定的普遍接受的观点；它将导致对约阿希姆·冯·里宾特洛普作为国际政治家的历史意义的看法的实质性修改。这本专著的研究还揭示了国家社会主义外交的其他方面，尤其是希特勒对1928-33年期间国际形势和世界力量平衡变化的认识。这一点和其他新的调查结果/解释将出现在案文中。该项目是基于对国际档案中心多年的艰苦调查，特别是在英国、德国和美国。这将是对知识的重大贡献。

The principal objective of this research project is to complete a monograph which firmly places the views, activities and impact of Hitler's former ambassador and foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, within the context of the international developments of the 1930s and 1940s. Ribbentrop is a much maligned figure in the historiography of the Second World War. He is depicted almost without exception in both scholarly and popular literature as a man devoid of ideas and initiative, a slavish servant of Hitler, an incompetent lightweight and a diplomatic nonentity. Even at the time, however, it was acknowledged that he enjoyed a position of unparalleled intimacy with Hitler whose closest confidant and advisor on foreign affairs he remained for the best part of the Third Reich era. Moreover, as was also recognised by contemporaries, Ribbentrop's position with Hitler offered him unrivalled opportunities to influence the latter's thinking and policy decisions, either by communicating or withholding significant information (on Britain's willingness to fight in 1939, for example) or through sustained discussion of any given issue. One of the crucial arguments advanced in this research is that Ribbentrop's influence over Hitler's decision-making in 1938-9 in particular was substantially greater than has previously been thought; indeed, that, in view of his own political agenda, Ribbentrop purposefully sought to misinform the Nazi leader in 1939 in order to engineer a conflict between Great Britain and Germany.The fact that Hitler, in circumvention of the traditional diplomatic channels, initially used Ribbentrop for important unofficial missions abroad, including intimate negotiations with British and French leaders as early as 1933, and thereafter promoted him to increasingly responsible and influential positions, culminating in the post of Reich Foreign Minister, which he held for seven years, itself suggests that there is much more to the Ribbentrop phenomenon than meets the eye. It certainly suggests that a serious re-evaluation of this individual's contribution to the international relations in which he played such an integral part is long overdue. The book will trace Ribbentrop's gravitation towards National Socialism and furnish a detailed account of his numerous and diverse forays into the realm of international diplomacy. It will provide much-needed information on his non-official initiatives in international affairs, such as his sponsoring of ties between British, French and German war veterans and his promotion of reciprocal cultural organisations and exchanges; it will endeavour to explain the nature of the relationship between Ribbentrop and Hitler, and between Ribbentrop and the other Nazi leaders, in the context of the foreign policy decision-making process of the Third Reich; it will analyse in depth the development by Ribbentrop of an alternative political and by implication military strategy which was designed to cater for the failure of Hitler's original plans in the sphere of Anglo-German relations; it will place special emphasis on the role of German-Soviet-Japanese collaboration in Ribbentrop's political thinking; it will convincingly challenge the generally accepted view of its principal subject's contribution to National Socialist foreign policy making; it will lead to a substantial revision of opinion on the historical significance of Joachim von Ribbentrop as an international statesman. The research for the monograph has also shed considerable light on other aspects of National Socialist diplomacy and, crucially, on Hitler's appreciation of the international situation and the shifting balance of world power during the period 1928-33. This and other new findings/interpretations will feature in the text. The project is based on years of painstaking investigations in international archive centres, notably in the United Kingdom, Germany and the USA. It will be a major contribution to knowledge.