The Politics of Judicial Independence in Britain's Changing Constitution

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IntroductionThe courts have a lot more power than they used to, which has heightened tension between politicians and the judges. That in turn has triggered a growing debate about judicial independence, and judicial accountability.The judges are institutionally more independent, with a separate Supreme Court, and the Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary in place of the Lord Chancellor. But they still feel uneasy. At their insistence, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 places a statutory duty on Ministers to uphold judicial independence. The Act does not define judicial independence. If it is to be upheld, it must be clearly understood by all the actors who are required to protect it. So two questions addressed by this project are:- What is the meaning of judicial independence, and its proper limits?- How is it best protected, and by whom?The new arrangements also raise questions about accountability. The Lord Chancellor was politically accountable for the whole judicial system. Who is now accountable, and to whom?Research questions- How do different political and legal actors understand judicial independence and judicial accountability?- What are the day to day contexts in which judicial independence and accountability arise as issues?- Who are the guardians of judicial independence, and accountability? How much coordination is there between them?- What do the new arrangements tell us about the changing relationship between the judges, government and Parliament?Academic importanceThere is little writing about judicial independence in the UK, and no accepted body of theory. We intend to develop a body of theory which explains the rationale for judicial independence and accountability in the UK, their proper limits, and practical requirements.Most books on judicial independence are comparative, edited collections. Ours will be an in depth study of how judicial independence and accountability operate within a specific system. It will examine not just high profile clashes, but the day to day decisions on the budget and management of the court service, judicial pay and pensions, complaints and discipline, appraisal and training. In the process it will identify all the 'hidden guardians' within the executive, parliament and the judiciary whose everyday decisions define how judicial independence and acccountability are interpreted in the UK.Political importanceThe project is very timely. A decade of constitutional reform has transformed the constitutional landscape, with much greater separation of powers. The Lord Chief Justice has 80 staff to support him in his new role. Parliament has invited the judges to explain how the new system works. All the actors - politicians, judges, parliamentarians and officials - are questioning different aspects of the new system, and developing a new set of rules. It is the perfect moment to capture the formal and informal conventions which are being developed; to explore emerging differences of view and the reasons behind them; and to suggest how some of those differences might be resolved. OutputsThe main outputs will be - a book- an interim and final report for policy makers- three academic articles- articles in practitioner journals.ImpactThere will be a series of high level practitioner seminars running throughout the project; public lectures; a website and blog; interviews for radio and TV; articles for the press, and for legal and political magazines. Project team and timetableThe research team have long experience of working with government, Parliament and the judiciary. Prof Robert Hazell (Constitution Unit, UCL) will lead the project, working with Prof Kate Malleson (Queen Mary) and Dr Graham Gee (Birmingham). It will be a three year project, running from Sept 2010 to August 2013.