Decision Theory with a Human Face

人性化的决策理论

• 批准号: AH/I003118/1
• 负责人: Richard Bradley
• 金额: $ 10.56万
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2012 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI003118%2F1
• 关键词: Decision; Theory; Human; Face

The aim of this research is the production of a book on decision making that applies to situations in which we don't know what all the alternative are and have not made up our mind about those that we are aware of. The first part of the book will present, explain and then reformulate the core of Bayesian decision theory, currently the standard theory of decision making. The focus will be on foundational questions and in particular on two problems: one normative, the other epistemological. The first is what might be termed the problem of justification, namely that of providing grounds for believing that people should follow its prescriptions. The second is the problem of interpretation, which in its starkest form is the question of how we can have knowledge of non-observable mental states such as beliefs and preferences. A solution to this problem is crucial to the applicability of decision theory, for unless we can determine what someone believes or desires, we cannot use the theory to say what he should do or explain what he was observed to do. The second part will address the problem of decision making in the kinds of situations described above. The main thought here is that since people cannot plan for all contingencies, a theory which gives advice on the presumption that agents can make their minds up about everything in advance is going to be of limited help. Consequently, this part of the project will attempt to address three main research questions. Firstly, how people should change their mind about the possibilities they face as they become aware of previously unforeseen features of them? Secondly, how should they make up their mind about what probability and desirability to attach to prospects in the first place? And thirdly, how should they make decisions when they have not made their mind up about all relevant features of the decision problem, including how likely are the various contingencies upon which the success of the their decisions depend and how desirable are the possible consequences of the choices they make.

这项研究的目的是编写一本关于决策的书，该书适用于我们不知道所有替代方案是什么并且尚未对我们所知道的方案做出决定的情况。本书的第一部分将介绍、解释并重新表述贝叶斯决策理论的核心，贝叶斯决策理论是目前决策的标准理论。重点将放在基础问题上，特别是两个问题：一个是规范性的，另一个是认识论的。第一个是所谓的正当性问题，即提供理由相信人们应该遵循其规定。第二个是解释问题，其最直接的形式是我们如何能够了解不可观察的心理状态（例如信仰和偏好）的知识。这个问题的解决方案对于决策理论的适用性至关重要，因为除非我们能够确定某人的信念或愿望，否则我们无法使用该理论来说明他应该做什么或解释他被观察到的行为。第二部分将解决上述情况下的决策问题。这里的主要思想是，由于人们无法为所有突发事件做好计划，因此假设代理人可以提前对所有事情做出决定的理论提供建议的帮助将是有限的。因此，该项目的这一部分将尝试解决三个主要研究问题。首先，当人们意识到自己以前无法预见的特征时，应该如何改变对自己面临的可能性的看法？其次，他们应该如何决定对潜在客户的可能性和愿望是什么？第三，当他们还没有弄清楚决策问题的所有相关特征时，他们应该如何做出决策，包括他们的决策成功所依赖的各种偶然事件的可能性有多大，以及他们所做的选择可能产生的后果有多大。

项目成果

ELLSBERG'S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES

艾尔斯伯格悖论和机会的价值

• DOI: 10.1017/s0266267115000358
• 发表时间: 2015
• 期刊: Economics and Philosophy
• 影响因子: 1.2
• 作者: Bradley R

How Valuable Are Chances?

机会有多宝贵？

• DOI: 10.1086/682915
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Philosophy of Science
• 影响因子: 1.7
• 作者: Stefánsson H

Counterfactual Desirability.

反事实的可取性。

• DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv023
• 发表时间: 2017-06
• 期刊: The British journal for the philosophy of science
• 作者: Bradley R;Stefánsson HO
• 通讯作者: Stefánsson HO

Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals

• DOI: 10.1215/00318108-1630921
• 发表时间: 2012-10-01
• 期刊: PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
• 影响因子: 3.5
• 作者: Bradley, Richard