Decision Theory with a Human Face

人性化的决策理论

• 批准号: AH/I003118/1
• 负责人: Richard Bradley
• 金额: $ 10.56万
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2012 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI003118%2F1
• 关键词: Decision; Theory; Human; Face

The aim of this research is the production of a book on decision making that applies to situations in which we don't know what all the alternative are and have not made up our mind about those that we are aware of. The first part of the book will present, explain and then reformulate the core of Bayesian decision theory, currently the standard theory of decision making. The focus will be on foundational questions and in particular on two problems: one normative, the other epistemological. The first is what might be termed the problem of justification, namely that of providing grounds for believing that people should follow its prescriptions. The second is the problem of interpretation, which in its starkest form is the question of how we can have knowledge of non-observable mental states such as beliefs and preferences. A solution to this problem is crucial to the applicability of decision theory, for unless we can determine what someone believes or desires, we cannot use the theory to say what he should do or explain what he was observed to do. The second part will address the problem of decision making in the kinds of situations described above. The main thought here is that since people cannot plan for all contingencies, a theory which gives advice on the presumption that agents can make their minds up about everything in advance is going to be of limited help. Consequently, this part of the project will attempt to address three main research questions. Firstly, how people should change their mind about the possibilities they face as they become aware of previously unforeseen features of them? Secondly, how should they make up their mind about what probability and desirability to attach to prospects in the first place? And thirdly, how should they make decisions when they have not made their mind up about all relevant features of the decision problem, including how likely are the various contingencies upon which the success of the their decisions depend and how desirable are the possible consequences of the choices they make.

这项研究的目的是制作一本关于决策的书，适用于我们不知道所有替代方案是什么，并且还没有对我们所知道的那些做出决定的情况。本书的第一部分将介绍，解释，然后重新制定贝叶斯决策理论的核心，目前的标准决策理论。重点将放在基本问题上，特别是两个问题：一个是规范性问题，另一个是认识论问题。第一个问题可以称为正当性问题，即提供理由让人们相信应该遵循它的处方。第二个是解释问题，最明显的形式是我们如何了解不可观察的心理状态，例如信仰和偏好。这个问题的解决方案对于决策理论的适用性至关重要，因为除非我们能够确定某人相信什么或渴望什么，否则我们就不能用这个理论来说他应该做什么或解释他被观察到要做什么。第二部分将讨论在上述各种情况下的决策问题。这里的主要思想是，既然人们无法为所有的意外事件做好计划，那么一个假设代理人可以提前做出决定的理论将是有限的帮助。因此，该项目的这一部分将试图解决三个主要的研究问题。首先，当人们意识到他们以前无法预见的特征时，他们应该如何改变对他们所面临的可能性的看法？第二，他们应该如何下定决心，把什么样的可能性和可取性放在第一位？第三，当他们还没有对决策问题的所有相关特征做出决定时，他们应该如何做出决策，包括他们的决策成功所依赖的各种突发事件的可能性有多大，以及他们所做的选择的可能后果有多理想。

项目成果

ELLSBERG'S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES

艾尔斯伯格悖论和机会的价值

• DOI: 10.1017/s0266267115000358
• 发表时间: 2015
• 期刊: Economics and Philosophy
• 影响因子: 1.2
• 作者: Bradley R

How Valuable Are Chances?

机会有多宝贵？

• DOI: 10.1086/682915
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Philosophy of Science
• 影响因子: 1.7
• 作者: Stefánsson H

Counterfactual Desirability.

反事实的可取性。

• DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv023
• 发表时间: 2017-06
• 期刊: The British journal for the philosophy of science
• 作者: Bradley R;Stefánsson HO
• 通讯作者: Stefánsson HO

Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals

• DOI: 10.1215/00318108-1630921
• 发表时间: 2012-10-01
• 期刊: PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
• 影响因子: 3.5
• 作者: Bradley, Richard