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Accuracy and epistemic deference

准确性和认知尊重

基本信息

批准号：
AH/I027363/1
负责人：
Richard Pettigrew
金额：
$ 3.42万
依托单位：
University of Bristol
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Fellowship
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2011 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI027363%2F1
关键词：
Accuracy epistemic deference

项目摘要

A coin is about to be tossed. You know that it is a fair coin. That is, you know that there is a 50% chance that it will land heads. But this is all you know. How confident should you be that it will land heads? 50%, surely. That is, you should treat the chance of it landing heads as a sort of expert to whose opinion you defer when forming your own. This is known as the Principal Principle. Another sort of expert to whose opinion it seems you should defer when forming your current opinion is your future self. If you know that your future self will be 70% confident in a particular outcome, you should have 70% confidence yourself, at least in normal circumstances. After all, your future self is typically better informed than you are, and has had longer to weigh the evidence. This is known as the Reflection Principle. The central question of this research project is this: Why should we obey the Principal Principle and the Reflection Principle? In what way do we err if we violate either of them?Above, I motivated these principles by appealing to certain intuitions we have about how we should form our opinion. But intuitions are notoriously unreliable and often vary depending on how they are elicited. So ideally we would like a more reliable, rigorous justification for these norms. Such justifications have been rather lacking in the philosophical literature. In this project, I will investigate the possibility of giving a more rigorous justification by appealing to a new strategy that has been used to great effect in answering related questions. The idea is this: Given a way that the world might be, certain levels of confidence are better than others. For instance, someone who has a very high degree of confidence in all truths and a very low degree of confidence in all falsehoods has better opinions than someone who has high confidence in falsehoods and low in truths. Inspired by this, some philosophers have tried to define a measure of how good a given opinion is for a particular way the world might be. With this sort of measure in hand, we might give a more rigorous justification of the Principal Principle and the Reflection Principle in the following way. Suppose it were the case that, whenever you had some opinions that violate the Principal Principle, then there were some opinions that satisfy it that you might have instead and that are better than your actual opinions (according to the measure of goodness of opinions) given any possible way the world could be. Then, it seems, this would justify the Principal Principle. After all, it would be better to do what that principle says you should do however the world turns out to be. So this way of arguing for the Principal Principle promises a rigorous justification if it works. And we might hope for a similar argument for the Reflection Principle.Does it work? My initial research shows that it does providing certain detailed philosophical claims about objective chances and future selves can be established. This research project seeks to provide the philosophical underpinnings required to make this argument work.

即将扔一枚硬币。你知道这是一枚公平的硬币。也就是说，您知道有 50% 的机会正面朝上。但这就是你所知道的全部。您对它会取得成功有多大信心？ 50%，当然。也就是说，你应该把它获得成功的机会视为一种专家的观点，在形成你自己的观点时，你应该尊重他的观点。这就是所谓的主要原则。另一种专家的观点是你在形成当前观点时应该遵循的，那就是你未来的自己。如果你知道未来的自己会对某个特定结果有 70% 的信心，那么你自己也应该有 70% 的信心，至少在正常情况下是这样。毕竟，未来的你通常比现在更了解情况，并且有更长的时间来权衡证据。这就是所谓的反射原理。本研究项目的中心问题是：为什么要遵循原则原则和反思原则？如果我们违反其中任何一个，我们会在哪些方面犯错？在上面，我通过诉诸我们对如何形成我们的观点的某些直觉来推动这些原则。但众所周知，直觉是不可靠的，而且通常会根据直觉的产生方式而有所不同。因此，理想情况下，我们希望为这些规范提供更可靠、更严格的理由。哲学文献中相当缺乏这样的理由。在这个项目中，我将研究通过诉诸一种新策略来提供更严格的论证的可能性，该策略在回答相关问题时发挥了巨大作用。这个想法是这样的：给定世界可能存在的方式，一定程度的信心比其他水平更好。例如，一个对所有真理都抱有很高信心而对所有谎言都抱有很低信心的人，比那些对谎言有很高信心而对真理有较低信心的人有更好的意见。受此启发，一些哲学家试图定义一种衡量标准，衡量给定的观点对于世界的某种特定方式来说有多好。有了这样的衡量标准，我们就可以通过以下方式对主要原理和反射原理进行更严格的论证。假设这样的情况，每当你有一些违反基本原则的意见时，就会有一些你可能拥有的满足它的意见，并且在考虑到世界可能存在的任何可能的方式时，这些意见比你的实际意见（根据意见的好坏程度）更好。那么，这似乎可以证明主要原则的合理性。毕竟，无论世界变成什么样，最好还是按照原则去做你应该做的事情。因此，如果这种论证主要原则的方式有效的话，它就会得到严格的论证。我们可能希望反射原理有类似的论证。它有效吗？我的初步研究表明，它确实提供了一些关于客观机会和未来自我可以建立的详细哲学主张。该研究项目旨在提供使这一论点发挥作用所需的哲学基础。