Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

规范性：认知性和实践性

• 批准号: AH/K008188/1
• 负责人: Daniel Whiting
• 金额: $ 23.93万
• 依托单位: University of Southampton
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2013 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FK008188%2F1
• 关键词: Normativity; Epistemic; Practical

What should I do? What should I think? For as long as there has been philosophy, philosophers have investigated questions like this. Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do, what one has reason or justification to do, or what it is right or wrong to do, not simply of what one in fact does. So conceived, practical normativity concerns how one should act, while epistemic normativity concerns how one should think.The tendency is to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think. But there is a growing awareness that treating the two issues separately leads to distortions and misunderstandings. Debates over epistemic normativity have failed to take on board developments on the practical side; those discussing practical normativity often make general claims whose implications in the epistemic case remain unexplored. Our project, which takes off from our highly successful research project, 'Aims and Norms', aims to explore issues about practical and epistemic normativity together, to examine the norms which concern us as agents alongside the norms which concern us as inquirers.Normativity raises many questions. What are the norms? What is their source? How do they fit into the world as revealed by the sciences? The tendency to explore such questions separately with regard to practical and epistemic norms is surprising. First, 'ought' and related terms do not appear to have radically different meanings in practical and epistemic contexts, e.g. when asking 'Ought we believe that carbon emissions cause global warming?' or 'Ought we cut emissions?' Second, there seem to be deep dependences between practical and epistemic norms. Whether I have reason to believe Kim is diabetic looks relevant to whether I should give her sweets. Third, the line between practical and epistemic norms is more blurred than is often supposed. Epistemic norms seem to govern not only beliefs but also actions, e.g. gathering evidence; equally, there seem to be practical or ethical norms which govern us as believers, e.g. one should be open-minded. Fourth, many of the issues that arise concerning practical norms arise concerning epistemic norms. For example, if there is a question as to how practical norms can fit into a natural world of inert matter and blind mechanical forces, then surely the same question arises about epistemic norms. These points strongly support exploring practical and epistemic normativity together.The project is organised in three stages. First, we will examine connections between practical and epistemic norms. How does what one ought to think influence what one ought to do and vice versa? Second, we will consider whether one can explain practical norms by appeal to epistemic norms or vice versa. Third, we will investigate the nature of normative judgment and the place of norms in the natural world. Ethicists have developed sophisticated frameworks for thinking about these issues regarding practical normativity. We will consider whether those frameworks can be applied to epistemic normativity and what this might tell us about both.The project will foster collaborative research on the above issues involving an international team of philosophers participating in three workshops, corresponding to each stage of the project, and a major conference. It will make available the results of this research through a series of well-placed publications and encourage wider involvement in thinking about the issues through activities aimed at a non-academic audience. The ambition is to see whether, by investigating practical alongside epistemic norms, we might pave the way for a unified conception of normativity and, thereby, a unified conception of ourselves, as both thinkers and doers.

我应该怎么办？我应该怎么想？自从有哲学以来，哲学家就一直在研究这样的问题。传统上，伦理学家解决第一个问题，而认识论解决第二个问题。这种分工对应于理论家在实践规范性和认知规范性之间做出的区分，其中规范性是一个人应该或可以做什么、一个人有理由或正当理由做什么、或者做什么是对或错的问题，而不仅仅是一个人实际上做了什么。如此看来，实践规范性涉及一个人应该如何行动，而认知规范性涉及一个人应该如何思考。趋势是独立于思考什么问题来研究做什么问题。但人们越来越认识到，分开处理这两个问题会导致扭曲和误解。关于认知规范性的争论未能考虑到实践方面的发展；那些讨论实践规范性的人经常提出一般性的主张，其对认知案例的影响尚未得到探索。我们的项目源于我们非常成功的研究项目“目标和规范”，旨在共同探索有关实践和认知规范性的问题，检验我们作为代理人所关心的规范以及我们作为询问者所关心的规范。规范性提出了许多问题。规范是什么？他们的来源是什么？他们如何适应科学揭示的世界？将实践规范和认知规范分开探讨这些问题的趋势令人惊讶。首先，“应该”和相关术语在实践和认知背景下似乎没有完全不同的含义，例如“应该”和相关术语。当问“我们是否应该相信碳排放导致全球变暖？”或“我们应该减少排放吗？”其次，实践规范和认知规范之间似乎存在深刻的依赖性。我是否有理由相信金患有糖尿病，看起来与我是否应该给她吃糖有关。第三，实践规范和认知规范之间的界限比通常想象的更加模糊。认知规范似乎不仅支配着信念，还支配着行动，例如：收集证据；同样，作为信徒，似乎也有一些实践或道德规范来约束我们，例如：一个人应该保持开放的心态。第四，许多与实践规范有关的问题都与认知规范有关。例如，如果存在关于实践规范如何适应惰性物质和盲目机械力的自然世界的问题，那么关于认知规范肯定也会出现同样的问题。这些观点有力地支持一起探索实践和认知规范性。该项目分为三个阶段。首先，我们将研究实践规范和认知规范之间的联系。一个人应该思考什么会影响一个人应该做什么，反之亦然？其次，我们将考虑是否可以通过诉诸认知规范来解释实践规范，反之亦然。第三，我们将研究规范判断的本质以及规范在自然世界中的地位。伦理学家已经开发出复杂的框架来思考这些有关实践规范性的问题。我们将考虑这些框架是否可以应用于认知规范性，以及这可能告诉我们什么。该项目将促进对上述问题的合作研究，涉及一个国际哲学家团队参加三个研讨会，对应于该项目的每个阶段，以及一个主要会议。它将通过一系列适当的出版物公布这项研究的结果，并通过针对非学术受众的活动鼓励更广泛地参与对问题的思考。我们的目标是看看，通过研究实践和认知规范，我们是否可以为规范性的统一概念铺平道路，从而为我们自己作为思想者和行动者的统一概念铺平道路。

项目成果

Getting Things Right - Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

把事情做好——合适、理由和价值

• DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198810322.001.0001
• 发表时间: 2022
• 作者: McHugh C

Exercising Doxastic Freedom

行使信仰自由

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00531.x
• 发表时间: 2011
• 期刊: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Mchugh C

The Normativity of Belief

信仰的规范性

• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anu079
• 发表时间: 2014
• 期刊: Analysis
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: McHugh C

Attitudinal control

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0643-7
• 发表时间: 2017-08-01
• 期刊: SYNTHESE
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: McHugh, Conor

What is Reasoning

什么是推理

• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzw068
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: Mind
• 影响因子: 1.8
• 作者: Conor McHugh;Jonathan Way
• 通讯作者: Jonathan Way