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Special Processes for the Reassessment and Removal of Judges in the Context of a Constitutional Transition: Strengthening the Rule of Law?

宪法过渡背景下重新评估和罢免法官的特别程序：加强法治？

基本信息

批准号：
AH/R005494/1
负责人：
Jan Van Zyl Smit
金额：
$ 20.86万
依托单位：
British Institute of International and Comparative Law
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2018 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FR005494%2F1
关键词：
Special Processes Reassessment Removal Judges

项目摘要

Societies in transition from authoritarian rule to constitutional democracy face profound challenges with regard to developing genuinely independent courts that are able to perform their necessary functions under the rule of law, which range from enforcing rights to resolving business disputes impartially in a way that is conducive to economic development. These societies must wrestle very early on with the decision of whether to retain judges who served under authoritarian rule. Is it essential that they enjoy security of tenure - a standard means of protecting judicial independence - or may these judges be required to undergo a special process of reassessment and removal?This project examines how such processes are designed and what implications they have for the rule of law. On the one hand, judges who owe their positions to an authoritarian regime may be unwilling or unable to perform their functions with due independence and impartiality. On the other hand, any process that involves the removal of judges risks setting a precedent for future governments to engineer the removal of judges whose decisions they dislike. In those countries that decide to modify or suspend judicial tenure, the design of special processes of reassessment and removal is therefore of critical importance to the rule of law.To date, most special processes appear to have been largely shaped by political and practical considerations rather than principled thinking about the rule of law. The planned 'de-Nazification' of the West German judiciary, for example, was scaled back due to a shortage of qualified judges without links to the Nazi party. Since the end of the Cold War, some countries in Eastern Europe have chosen not to subject their judges to significant scrutiny while others have gone so far as requiring all judges to reapply for their positions. In Latin America, truth commissions have examined the record of the judiciary under military rule, and incoming governments have often insisted that the most senior judges resign or be dismissed. In the Arab world, the Iraqi judiciary was decimated by a highly politicized process of 'de-Ba'athification', and Tunisia has more recently enabled its truth commission to recommend the disciplining of judges. In Africa, Kenya has carried out a judicial vetting process under a new constitution. Our research will use a comparative methodology to analyse special processes and examine how they can be designed to strengthen the rule of law. At the heart of the project will be 8 case studies by experts with insider knowledge of judicial reforms in a transitional country. The project team will draw on these case studies to build a wider typology of special process and develop recommendations, where appropriate, for good practice in the design of each of the main types. These may provide grounds for revisiting international norms which are currently silent about the problem of authoritarian-era judges in transitional countries. Our participants include a consultation group of 3 senior experts and 2 international partner organisations, International IDEA and the Venice Commission, which provide advice and technical assistance on constitutional transitions. The outcomes of this project will have implications for governments and political groups in transitional countries, for institutions tasked with implementing judicial reforms, international bodies working on these issues, judges and lawyers, and civil society. We have designed a two-way engagement strategy to reach and consult as many of these research users as possible. This process is built on the practical experience of our participants and their extensive networks in the field. The project outputs will also be disseminated through these networks, to maximize prospects that they will be used in transitional societies, to the benefit of ordinary people whose rights and economic interests will be advanced by a stronger rule of law.

从威权统治向宪政民主过渡的社会在发展真正独立的法院方面面临着深刻的挑战，这些法院能够在法治下履行其必要的职能，从执行权利到以有利于经济发展的方式公正地解决商业纠纷。这些社会必须很早就决定是否保留在威权统治下任职的法官。他们是否有必要享有任期保障--这是保护司法独立的一种标准手段--还是要求这些法官经历一个重新评估和解职的特殊程序？这个项目审查了这些程序是如何设计的，以及它们对法治有何影响。一方面，受惠于专制政权的法官可能不愿意或不能以应有的独立和公正履行其职能。另一方面，任何涉及罢免法官的程序都有可能开创一个先例，让未来的政府策划罢免他们不喜欢其裁决的法官。因此，在那些决定修改或暂停司法任期的国家，重新评估和罢免特别程序的设计对法治至关重要。迄今为止，大多数特别程序似乎主要是出于政治和实际考虑，而不是对法治的原则性思考。例如，由于缺乏与纳粹党没有联系的合格法官，计划中的西德司法机构“去纳粹化”计划被缩减。自冷战结束以来，东欧的一些国家选择不对其法官进行严格的审查，而另一些国家甚至要求所有法官重新申请他们的职位。在拉丁美洲，真相委员会审查了军方统治下的司法机构的记录，即将上任的政府经常坚持要求最高级别的法官辞职或被解职。在阿拉伯世界，伊拉克的司法系统被高度政治化的“去复兴党”进程摧毁，突尼斯最近允许其真相委员会建议对法官进行纪律处分。在非洲，肯尼亚根据新宪法开展了司法审查程序。我们的研究将使用比较方法来分析特别程序，并审查如何设计这些程序以加强法治。该项目的核心将是8个案例研究，由对转型国家的司法改革有内部了解的专家进行。项目组将利用这些案例研究建立更广泛的特殊程序类型学，并酌情为每种主要程序的设计提出良好做法的建议。这些可能为重新审视目前对转型期国家专制时代法官问题保持沉默的国际规范提供了理由。我们的参与者包括一个由3名高级专家和2个国际伙伴组织组成的咨询小组、国际思想和威尼斯委员会，它们就宪法过渡提供建议和技术援助。该项目的成果将对转型期国家的政府和政治团体、负责执行司法改革的机构、致力于这些问题的国际机构、法官和律师以及民间社会产生影响。我们设计了一种双向参与战略，以尽可能多地接触和咨询这些研究用户。这一进程建立在我们的参与者及其在实地的广泛网络的实际经验的基础上。还将通过这些网络传播项目成果，以最大限度地扩大将其用于过渡社会的前景，造福于普通人，他们的权利和经济利益将因更强有力的法治而得到促进。