DeepSecurity - Applying Deep Learning to Hardware Security

随着供应链的全球化，今天的电子设备的设计和制造现在分布在世界各地，例如通过使用海外铸造厂、第三方知识产权(IP)和第三方测试设施。在设计和组装阶段可能涉及许多不同的不可信实体，因此，确保设备的完整性和真实性变得越来越困难。供应链现在被认为容易受到一系列基于硬件的威胁，包括硬件特洛伊木马程序、IP盗版、集成电路(IC)生产过剩或回收、逆向工程、IC克隆和旁路攻击。这些攻击是对军事、医疗、政府、交通和其他关键和嵌入式系统应用程序的主要安全威胁。该项目将使用一种通用的方法来调查其中的两种威胁，即在侧通道攻击和硬件特洛伊木马的环境中使用深度学习。侧通道攻击(SCA)利用来自密码实现的物理信号泄漏，例如功耗、电磁辐射或定时特征，并且已经成为许多实际世界演示的严重安全问题，例如从公共交通票务应用中使用的MIFARE DESFire智能卡和Xilinx Virtex-4/5 FPGA上的加密比特流中恢复密钥。硬件特洛伊木马(HT)是对电路的恶意修改，以控制、修改、禁用、监视或影响电路的运行。尽管在实践中还没有检测到HTS的公开报告，但在2008年，有人推测叙利亚雷达的一个严重故障可能是故意通过商业现成(COTS)微处理器内的一个隐藏的后门触发的。这项拟议的项目旨在研究深度学习在SCA和HT检测中的应用，最终目标是在电子设计自动化工具中利用基于深度学习的验证过程来向设计者提供关于其设计安全性的反馈。关于电话会议，该项目解决了“在开发过程中保持对安全的信心”的挑战，更具体地说，是“建立供应链信心”和“新的硬件分析工具包和技术”。

With the globalisation of supply chains the design and manufacture of today's electronic devices are now distributed worldwide, for example, through the use of overseas foundries, third party intellectual property (IP) and third party test facilities. Many different untrusted entities may be involved in the design and assembly phases and therefore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ensure the integrity and authenticity of devices. The supply chain is now considered to be susceptible to a range of hardware-based threats, including hardware Trojans, IP piracy, integrated circuit (IC) overproduction or recycling, reverse engineering, IC cloning and side-channel attacks. These attacks are major security threats to military, medical, government, transportation, and other critical and embedded systems applications. The proposed project will use a common approach to investigate two of these threats, namely the use of deep-learning in the context of side-channel attacks and hardware Trojans.Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit physical signal leakages, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanations or timing characteristics, from cryptographic implementations, and have become a serious security concern with many practical real-world demonstrations, such as secret key recovery from the Mifare DESFire smart card used in public transport ticketing applications and from encrypted bitstreams on Xilinx Virtex-4/5 FPGAs. A hardware Trojan (HT) is a malicious modification of a circuit in order to control, modify, disable, monitor or affect the operation of the circuit. Although there have been no public reports of HTs detected in practice, in 2008 it was speculated that a critical failure in a Syrian radar may have been intentionally triggered via a hidden 'back door' inside a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microprocessor. The proposed project seeks to investigate the application of deep learning in SCA and HT detection, with the ultimate goal of utilising deep learning based verification processes in Electronic Design Automation tools to provide feedback to designers on the security of their designs. In relation to the call, the project addresses the challenge of 'maintaining confidence in security through the development process', and more specifically 'building supply chain confidence' and 'novel hardware analysis toolsets and techniques'.