Exclusion amid Inclusion: Power-Sharing and Non-Dominant Minorities

2009年，欧洲人权法院以14票对3票裁定波黑三方总统选举规则，即只允许波斯尼亚克族、波斯尼亚克族和波斯尼亚塞族参加选举，这是对其他少数群体，即罗姆人和犹太社区的歧视。这是因为波斯尼亚的宪法框架和总统安排的目的是容纳和包括三个组成民族，但不包括不愿以三个种族群体来确定身份的成员。虽然这被认为是结束1992-5年战争的必要条件（Weller and Wolff 2005），但它阻止了民主的巩固，并将不认同三大主导社区的个人和团体边缘化。波斯尼亚犹太社区领袖雅各布·芬奇（Jakob Finci）将此案提交给欧洲人权法院，他在回应该裁决时指出，波斯尼亚的制度规则是“将波斯尼亚人民分为一等公民和二等公民的不公正问题”（Balkanist 2015）。权力分享要求主要社会（种族）行动者在治理过程中有代表性和参与，这种权力分享已在布隆迪、黎巴嫩、科索沃、马其顿、北爱尔兰、波斯尼亚-黑塞哥维那和伊拉克等不同地区被采用，并促进了世界上一些分裂最严重的地区从战争到和平的过渡。然而，虽然权力分享经常被标榜为一种民主和包容的方式来管理种族差异，但它面临着一个重大的权衡。为了使权力分享创造稳定和安抚分裂的群体，它必须边缘化那些没有直接参与冲突的行为者，我们称之为非主导群体。作为这个项目的一部分，我们确定了三种在权力分享制度的最初设计中被忽视的非主导群体，他们仍然处于冲突后政治的边缘：非民族少数民族、重新结盟的少数民族和微型少数民族。我们将这种有利于大群体的制度性偏见称为“包容中排斥”（EAI）困境。我们试图回答以下研究问题：如何最好地实施权力分享安排来解释EAI问题？本研究项目旨在面对企业人工智能的困境，并为其解决提供可行和可行的建议。我们试图回答以下研究问题：如何最好地实施权力分享安排来解释EAI问题？我们用三种方法来回答这个问题。我们将进行1)对权力分享制度的宏观政治分析，以评估其纠正EAI困境的能力；2)四个比较案例研究（北爱尔兰、波斯尼亚-黑塞哥维那、黎巴嫩和马其顿），采用“结构化、集中”的比较方法，调查优势群体的包容与非优势群体的排斥之间的关系（George and Bennett 2005）。3)对参与权力分享的政党和争取立法代表权的政党的政治家、三种非主导群体的社区活动家以及从事民主促进和解决冲突的国际组织的代表进行半结构化访谈。总体而言，我们评估了参与权力分享的国家的经验，以便制定一系列修改制度框架的政策建议，以适应在最初制度设计下被边缘化或在和平时期出现的身份群体。这是及时的相关性：我们的概念框架可以扩展到我们的比较案例之外的社会，在这些案例中，和平受到间歇性暴力、冻结冲突和/或主导群体之间的活跃暴力冲突的破坏，但也影响到非主导群体。

In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled 14-3 that Bosnia-Herzegovina's election rules for its tripartite presidency, which allow only Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs to stand for election, were discriminatory against other minority groups, namely the Roma and Jewish communities. This is because Bosnia's constitutional framework, alongside the presidential arrangement, is designed to accommodate and include the three constituent peoples but not members who prefer not to identify in terms of three ethnic groups. While this was thought necessary to end the 1992-5 war (Weller and Wolff 2005), it has forestalled the consolidation of democracy and has marginalised individuals and groups who do not identify with the three dominant communities. As Jakob Finci, the leader of Bosnia's Jewish community who took the case to the ECHR, noted in response to the ruling, Bosnia's institutional rules are "a problem of injustice that divides Bosnian people into first and second class citizens" (Balkanist 2015). Power-sharing, which entails the representation and participation of major societal (ethnic) actors in the process of governing, has been adopted in places as diverse as Burundi, Lebanon, Kosovo, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq and has facilitated a war-to-peace transition in some of the world's most deeply divided places. However, while power-sharing is often heralded as a democratic and inclusive approach to managing ethnic difference, it faces a significant trade-off. For power-sharing to create stability and pacify the divided groups, it must marginalise those actors who were not directly involved in conflict, who we refer to as non-dominant groups. As part of this project, we identify three kinds of non-dominant groups who were neglected in the original design of power-sharing institutions and remain on the sidelines of postconflict politics: non-ethnic minorities, re-aligned minorities, and micro-minorities. We refer to this institutional bias in favour of large groups as the "exclusion amid inclusion" (EAI) dilemma. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? This research project is designed to confront the EAI dilemma and offer feasible and viable recommendations for its resolution. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? We answer this question through a threefold methodological approach. We shall conduct 1) a macro-political analysis of power-sharing institutions to assess their ability to redress the EAI dilemma, 2) four comparative case studies (Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon and Macedonia) investigating the relationship between the inclusion of dominant groups and the exclusion of non-dominant groups, employing a "structured, focused" method of comparison (George and Bennett 2005), and 3) semi-structured interviews with politicians from parties that participate in power-sharing and from parties that struggle for legislative representation, community activists from the three kinds of non-dominant groups identified, and representatives of international organisations engaged in democracy promotion and conflict resolution. Overall, we assess the experiences of states engaged in power-sharing in order to develop a series of policy proposals for modifying the institutional framework to accommodate identity groups that have either been marginalised under the initial institutional design, or who have emerged during the period of peace. This is of timely relevance: our conceptual framework can be extended to societies beyond our comparative cases where peace is marred by episodic violence, frozen conflict, and/or active violent conflict between the dominant groups, but also affecting the non-dominant groups.