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Exclusion amid Inclusion: Power-Sharing and Non-Dominant Minorities

包容中的排斥：权力分享和非主导少数群体

基本信息

批准号：
ES/P003036/1
负责人：
Timofey Agarin
金额：
$ 48.81万
依托单位：
Queen's University Belfast
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2017 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FP003036%2F1
关键词：
Exclusion amid Inclusion Power Sharing

项目摘要

In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled 14-3 that Bosnia-Herzegovina's election rules for its tripartite presidency, which allow only Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs to stand for election, were discriminatory against other minority groups, namely the Roma and Jewish communities. This is because Bosnia's constitutional framework, alongside the presidential arrangement, is designed to accommodate and include the three constituent peoples but not members who prefer not to identify in terms of three ethnic groups. While this was thought necessary to end the 1992-5 war (Weller and Wolff 2005), it has forestalled the consolidation of democracy and has marginalised individuals and groups who do not identify with the three dominant communities. As Jakob Finci, the leader of Bosnia's Jewish community who took the case to the ECHR, noted in response to the ruling, Bosnia's institutional rules are "a problem of injustice that divides Bosnian people into first and second class citizens" (Balkanist 2015). Power-sharing, which entails the representation and participation of major societal (ethnic) actors in the process of governing, has been adopted in places as diverse as Burundi, Lebanon, Kosovo, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq and has facilitated a war-to-peace transition in some of the world's most deeply divided places. However, while power-sharing is often heralded as a democratic and inclusive approach to managing ethnic difference, it faces a significant trade-off. For power-sharing to create stability and pacify the divided groups, it must marginalise those actors who were not directly involved in conflict, who we refer to as non-dominant groups. As part of this project, we identify three kinds of non-dominant groups who were neglected in the original design of power-sharing institutions and remain on the sidelines of postconflict politics: non-ethnic minorities, re-aligned minorities, and micro-minorities. We refer to this institutional bias in favour of large groups as the "exclusion amid inclusion" (EAI) dilemma. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? This research project is designed to confront the EAI dilemma and offer feasible and viable recommendations for its resolution. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? We answer this question through a threefold methodological approach. We shall conduct 1) a macro-political analysis of power-sharing institutions to assess their ability to redress the EAI dilemma, 2) four comparative case studies (Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon and Macedonia) investigating the relationship between the inclusion of dominant groups and the exclusion of non-dominant groups, employing a "structured, focused" method of comparison (George and Bennett 2005), and 3) semi-structured interviews with politicians from parties that participate in power-sharing and from parties that struggle for legislative representation, community activists from the three kinds of non-dominant groups identified, and representatives of international organisations engaged in democracy promotion and conflict resolution. Overall, we assess the experiences of states engaged in power-sharing in order to develop a series of policy proposals for modifying the institutional framework to accommodate identity groups that have either been marginalised under the initial institutional design, or who have emerged during the period of peace. This is of timely relevance: our conceptual framework can be extended to societies beyond our comparative cases where peace is marred by episodic violence, frozen conflict, and/or active violent conflict between the dominant groups, but also affecting the non-dominant groups.

2009年，欧洲人权法院以14-3的裁决认定，波黑的三方主席团选举规则只允许波斯尼亚人、波斯尼亚克罗地亚人和波斯尼亚塞尔维亚人参加选举，这是对其他少数群体的歧视，即罗姆人和犹太人社区。这是因为波斯尼亚的宪法框架以及总统安排旨在容纳和包括三个组成民族，但不包括不愿以三个族裔群体来确定身份的成员。虽然这被认为是结束1992- 1995年战争的必要条件（Weller和Wolff 2005），但它阻止了民主的巩固，并使不认同三个主要社区的个人和团体边缘化。正如将案件提交给欧洲人权法院的波斯尼亚犹太社区领导人雅各布·芬奇（Jakob Finci）在回应裁决时指出，波斯尼亚的制度规则是“将波斯尼亚人民分为一等公民和二等公民的不公正问题”。权力分享需要主要社会（族裔）行为者在治理进程中的代表权和参与权，在布隆迪、黎巴嫩、科索沃、马其顿、北方爱尔兰、波斯尼亚-黑塞哥维那和伊拉克等不同的地方都采取了这种做法，并在世界上一些分歧最严重的地方促进了从战争到和平的过渡。然而，虽然权力分享往往被誉为管理族裔差异的民主和包容性办法，但它面临着重大的取舍。为了让权力分享创造稳定并安抚分裂的群体，它必须使那些没有直接参与冲突的行为者边缘化，我们称之为非主导群体。作为该项目的一部分，我们确定了三种非主导群体，他们在权力分享机构的原始设计中被忽视，并在冲突后政治中处于边缘地位：非少数民族，重新结盟的少数民族和微型少数民族。我们把这种有利于大群体的制度性偏见称为“包容中的排斥”困境。我们试图回答以下研究问题：如何才能最好地实施权力分享安排，以解决EAI问题？本研究计画旨在面对EAI的困境，并提供可行且可行的解决方案。我们试图回答以下研究问题：如何才能最好地实施权力分享安排，以解决EAI问题？我们通过三重方法来回答这个问题。我们将进行1）一个宏观政治分析的权力分享机构，以评估他们的能力，纠正EAI困境，2）四个比较案例研究（北方爱尔兰、波斯尼亚-黑塞哥维那、黎巴嫩和马其顿）采用“有条理、有重点”的比较方法，调查纳入占主导地位的群体和排除非占主导地位的群体之间的关系（乔治和班尼特，2005年），和3）半结构化的采访与政治家的政党，参与权力分享和政党的立法代表权，社区活动家从三种非主导群体确定，和国际组织的代表从事民主促进和解决冲突。总的来说，我们评估的经验，从事权力分享的国家，以制定一系列的政策建议，修改体制框架，以适应身份的群体，要么被边缘化的初步制度设计，或谁出现在和平时期。这是及时的相关性：我们的概念框架可以扩展到社会以外的比较案例，在这些案例中，和平受到偶发暴力、冻结冲突和（或）主导群体之间的活跃暴力冲突的破坏，但也影响到非主导群体。