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Partnership Schools for Liberia: Impact on Accountability Mechanisms and Education Outcomes

利比里亚合作学校：对问责机制和教育成果的影响

基本信息

批准号：
ES/P006043/1
负责人：
Justin Sandefur
金额：
$ 71.29万
依托单位：
Innovations for Poverty Action
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2018 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FP006043%2F1
关键词：
Partnership Schools Liberia Impact Accountability

项目摘要

Liberia's public education system is moribund. The civil war of 1999-2003 and the Ebola epidemic of 2014 have left the Ministry of Education with little capacity to run a national school system. An effort to clean thousands of ghost teachers from Ministry payrolls was cut short (New York Times, 2016), and while systematic data is scarce, teacher absenteeism appears common (Mulkeen, 2009). Nearly two-thirds of primary aged children are not in school, including over 80 percent of children in the poorest quintile, placing Liberia in the lowest percentile of net enrollment rates in the world, and at the 7th percentile in youth (15-24) literacy (EPDC, 2014).Faced with these dire statistics, the Liberian Ministry of Education announced in early 2016 that it would contract the operation of government primary schools to a group of private companies. Key features of this public-private partnership are that (a) all schools will remain free to students, and (b) teachers will be unionized civil servants, drawing from the existing teaching corps.We propose a large-scale field experiment to study the effect of this new Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL), comparing 120 schools that have been delegated to management by private operators to 120 control schools under government management. The randomized field experiment will allow us to investigate three main aspects of accountability:1. Managerial accountability (of teachers to private operators). A central hypothesis underlying Liberia's charter school program is that private operators with greater capacity to implement routine performance management systems, regularly monitor teacher attendance, and provide teachers with frequent feedback and support will help to overcome teacher absenteeism and low education quality. This is not about carrots and sticks. We will test private operators' ability to generate accountability without authority to fire teachers or hire new teachers on flexible contracts.2. Bottom-up accountability (of teachers and operators to parents). An underlying hypothesis behind charter schools is that they will be more reactive to parents demands than traditional public schools because their funding is linked directly to enrollment numbers. We will test this by comparing student transfers (exit) and parental involvement (voice) in PSL and control schools.3. Top-down, results-based accountability (of private operators to the Ministry of Education). Charter school operators' contracts can be terminated if they do not achieve certain pre-established standards, commonly known as results-based accountability. The first year of the PSL pilot (2016/17) will lack any formal mechanism to hold operators accountable for results. A major innovation and focus of the year 2 expansion under study here is to develop and test different forms of top-down accountability based on measurable learning gains.This proposal seeks support for a follow-up study to track the longer-term effects of the PSL program in years two and three of operation (2017/18 and 2018/19) focused on scalability and sustainability. A separate evaluation of the first year PSL pilot (2016/17) is already underway and will be nearing completion when DFID-ESRC funding decisions are made. The longer-term follow-up study is of paramount importance for several reasons. First, it is important to document whether any learning gains achieved in year 1 can be maintained over a longer horizon. Second, the year 1 pilot has been heavily subsidized and disproportionately concentrated in Monrovia, whereas years 2 and 3 will focus on more cost-effective and sustainable models, including new schools in more remote and underserved areas. Third, in years 2 and 3 the program will introduce new top-down results-based accountability measures mentioned above, which are a major focus of our current proposal.

利比里亚的公共教育系统已经奄奄一息。1999-2003年的内战和2014年的埃博拉疫情使教育部几乎没有能力管理全国学校系统。从教育部工资单上清除数千名幽灵教师的努力被缩短了（纽约，2016年），虽然系统数据很少，但教师缺勤似乎很常见（Mulkeen，2009年）。近三分之二的小学适龄儿童没有上学，包括最贫穷的五分之一人口中80%以上的儿童，使利比里亚处于世界上净入学率最低的百分位，青年（15-24岁）识字率处于第七个百分位面对这些可怕的统计数据，利比里亚教育部在2016年初宣布，它将把政府小学的运营承包给一批私营公司。这一公私合作伙伴关系的主要特点是：（a）所有学校将继续对学生免费开放，（B）教师将是工会公务员，从现有的教师队伍中抽调。比较120所交由私人机构管理的学校和120所由政府管理的对照学校。随机现场实验将使我们能够调查问责制的三个主要方面：1。（教师对私人经营者的）管理问责制。利比里亚特许学校方案的一个核心假设是，私营经营者如果有更大的能力执行常规业绩管理制度，定期监测教师出勤情况，并经常向教师提供反馈和支持，将有助于克服教师缺勤和教育质量低下的问题。这不是胡萝卜加大棒的问题我们将测试私人经营者在没有权力解雇教师或以灵活合同雇用新教师的情况下产生问责制的能力。自下而上的问责制（教师和运营商对家长的责任）。特许学校背后的一个基本假设是，它们将比传统的公立学校更能回应家长的要求，因为它们的资金与入学人数直接相关。我们将通过比较PSL和对照学校的学生转学（退出）和父母参与（声音）来测试这一点。自上而下、基于结果的问责制（私营运营商对教育部的问责制）。特许学校经营者的合同可以终止，如果他们没有达到某些预先确定的标准，通常称为基于结果的问责制。PSL试点的第一年（2016/17）将缺乏任何正式机制来让运营商对结果负责。第二年扩展的一个主要创新和重点是在可衡量的学习成果的基础上开发和测试不同形式的自上而下的问责制。该提案寻求对后续研究的支持，以跟踪PSL计划在第二年和第三年（2017/18和2018/19）的长期影响，重点关注可扩展性和可持续性。对第一年PSL试点（2016/17）的单独评估已经在进行中，并将在DFID-ESRC做出资助决定时接近完成。长期随访研究至关重要，原因有几个。首先，必须记录第一年取得的任何学习成果是否可以在更长的时间内保持。第二，第一年的试点项目得到大量补贴，不成比例地集中在蒙罗维亚，而第二和第三年将侧重于更具成本效益和可持续的模式，包括在更偏远和服务不足的地区建立新学校。第三，在第二年和第三年，该方案将引入上述新的自上而下的基于结果的问责制措施，这是我们目前提案的一个主要重点。